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AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF
FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE
CHARMING BETSY CAN ON
INGRID BRUNK WUERTIH*
Abstract: Although international law has figured prominently in many
disputes around actions of the U.S. military, the precise relationship
between international law and the President's war powers has gone
largely unexplored. This Article seeks to clarify one important aspect of
that relationship: the role of international law in determining the scope
of Congress's general authorizations for the use of force. In the seminal
case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the plurality opinion used international law to
interpret the authorization by Congress for the use of force, but did so
without adequate attention to the content or interpretive function of
international law. This Article identifies and defends a better approach:
courts should presume that general authorizations for the use of force do
not empower the President to violate international law. Such a pre-
sumption is consistent with long-standing tools of statutory interpretation
reflected in the Charming Betsy canon, maximizes the presumed pre-
ferences of Congress, advances separation of powers values, and promotes
normative values that favor the use of international law as an interpretive
tool.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between international law and the President's
wartime authority under the U.S. Constitution is an important but
largely unexplored subtext in many post-September 11, 2001 legal
disputes. Examples include the detentions of Yaser Hamdi and Jose
Padilla as "enemy combatants," military trials for Guantanamo de-
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tainees, and allegations of torture at Abu Ghraib prison. Critics
charge that the Executive Branch violated both international law and
the U.S. Constitution, while the George W. Bush administration has
defended its actions in part on the grounds that they come within the
President's power as Commander in Chief.' Government lawyers have
also appealed to international law to justify an expansive view of the
President's power as Commander in Chief.2 For their part, lower
courts have invoked international law in confusing ways as they seek
I See, e.g., Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10
U.S.C. § 801 (West Supp. 2002) (authorizing the detention and trial by military commis-
sion of non-citizens based in part on the President's power as Commander in Chief); Brief
for Petitioner at *35-38, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004
WL 542777 (arguing that petitioner's detention falls within the Commander in Chief's
wartime authority); Brief for Respondents at *13-16, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633
(2004) (No. 03-6696), 2003 WL 23189498 (same); Memorandum from President George
W. Bush, to National Security Advisors 1-2 (Feb. 7, 2002) (determining, based on author-
it), as Commander in Chief, that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda prisoners from the conflict
in Afghanistan qualify as prisoners of war), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (date released June 22, 2004); Memorandum from Jay
S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 36-39, 46 (Aug. 1, 2002) (arguing that it
may be unconstitutional to apply federal laws and treaties prohibiting torture to actions
taken under the President's authority as Commander in Chief), available at http:// rww2.
gwn.ednt/-nsarch iv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB]27/02.08.01.pdf (date released June 22, 2004); see
also )iane Marie Amani, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (describing
various sources of international law implicated by the torture at Abu Ghraib); Laura A.
Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International
Tribunals, and the Rile of Law, 75 S. CAL.. L. REV. 1407, 1413-32 (2002) (describing objec-
tions to detentions and military tribunals based on international law and the U.S. Consti-
tution); Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Chraib Prison, 98 AM.J. INT'L L.
591, 591-96 (2004) (describing the legal debate surrounding the torture allegations at
Abu Ghraib).
2 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003) (accepting the gov-
ernment's argument and reasoning that Yaser Hamdi "is being held as an enemy combat-
ant pursuant to the well-established laws and customs of war"), vacated and remanded, 124 S.
Ct. 2633 (2004); Petitioner's Brief at *27-34, Padilla (No. 03-1027) (relying on the "laws
and customs of war" to show that the President has the constitutional authority to detain
U.S. citizens as enemy combatants); Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Briefing on De-
tainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay (Feb. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Transcript, U.S. Dep't
of Defense, Briefing on Detainee Operations] ("As I stated, under the laws of war, we have
a right to hold enemy combatants who represent a threat to the United States and its
forces off the battlefield." (quoting Paul Butler, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict)), http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0443.htmil (last updated Feb. 13, 2004); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Defense, DOD Announces Draft Detainee Review Process (Mar. 3, 2004) [herein-
after Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense] (stating that "the law of war permits the deten-
tion of enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict"), http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/2004/nr2OO40303-0403.ltnl (last updated Mar. 3, 2004).
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to demarcate the constitutional authority of the President during
war.3 In the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, citation to international law by both the habeas petitioner
and the government met with some success-all nine Justices made at
least passing reference to international law in interpreting the scope
of the President's wartime power.4
This Article seeks to clarify one aspect of the relationship be-
tween international law and the courts' construction of the Presi-
dent's war powers-the role of international law in determining the
scope of Congress's general authorization for the use of force. This
use of international law was important to the Supreme Court's opin-
ions in Hamdi, which considered a general authorization by Congress
for the President to use force; the authorization did not explicitly in-
clude detentions.5 The four-Justice plurality opinion used interna-
tional law in part to interpret the authorization as including the de-
tention of "enemy combatants," but only until the cessation of
hostilities.6 The plurality opinion relied on international law but
failed to explain in full its connection to the authorization provided
by Congress, or to distinguish among different interpretive uses and
different kinds of international law.7 Justice Clarence Thomas ap-
peared to reject the plurality's use of international law outright, at
least insofar as it limited the authority of the President,8 and four
otherJustices disagreed with the use of international law in the Hamdi
case itself, but left open whether international law might be relevant
in future cases. 9 The Hamdi opinions thus create substantial confusion
3 For example, the district court opinion in Rumsfeld v. Padilla included a long discus-
sion of the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants, but the purpose of that
discussion is not clear. See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590-93, 596 (S.D.N.Y 2002),
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd
and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). Similarly, the district court opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld discussed international law, but the purpose of that discussion is not clear either.
See 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 530-31 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated
and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The Supreme Court did little to clarify the role of
international law in these cases. See infra notes 64-135 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 74-129 and accompanying text.
5 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
infra note 67.
6 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639-42 (2004) (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.).
7 See infra notes 74-121 and accompanying text.
8 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2679 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
9 Id. at 2657-59 (SouterJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 2671-72 n.5 (ScaliaJ., dissenting, joined by
StevensJ.).
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about the role of international law in interpreting general authoriza-
tions by Congress for the President to use force.
The lack of clarity around this use of international law is particu-
larly troubling for two principle reasons. First, congressional authori-
zation is a key factor in determining the scope of the President's war
powers.10 For all nine of the Justices in Hamdi, the presence or ab-
sence of congressional authorization was important in determining
the lawfulness of the President's actions.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit's decision in another detention case, Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, also turned on congressional authorization, 12 as have recent
decisions by district courts.' 3 The importance of congressional
authorization in these cases builds on the Court's seminal opinion in
Dames & Moore v. Regan 14 and Justice RobertJackson's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,15 in which the views of Congress,
gleaned from a variety of sources, were critical to the construction of
10 See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (granting habeas relief to
civilians tried by military commissions that exceeded congressional authorization); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11, 25 (1946) (denying habeas relief when trial by military commis-
sion was specifically authorized by federal statute); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 217-18 (1944) (reasoning that "we arc unable to conclude that it was beyond the war
power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those ofJapanese ancestry from the West
Coast war area at the time they did"); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91-93
(1943) (upholding conviction of American citizen ofJapanese ancestry for violating an Act
of Congress that made it a misdemeanor to disregard knowingly restrictions authorized by
an Executive Order of the President); Ex parte Qnirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35, 48 (1942) (denying
habeas relief where trial by military commission was specifically authorized by federal stat-
ute); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708, 711 (1900) (invalidating a seizure of prop-
erty that lacked explicit statutory or presidential authorization and that violated the law of
nations); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866) (granting habeas relief to peti-
tioner whose trial by military commission during the Civil War violated an Act of Con-
gress); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670-71 (1862) (reasoning that because
Congress had retroactively blessed the forfeitures, the Court did not have to decide
whether such act was "necessary under the circumstances"); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 129 (1814) (holding that the President lacked the power to
confiscate certain property absent specific congressional authorization).
11 See inira notes 74-129 and accompanying text.
12 352 F.3d at 718-24 (concluding that Jose Padilla's detention lacked congressional
authorization), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); id. at 728-30 (Wesley, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that Congress had authorized Padilla's
detention).
13 See generally Padilla v. Haift, No. Civ.A.2:04-2221-26A, slip op., 2005 WL 465691
(D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2005) (mere.) (concluding that Padilla's detention lacked congressional
authorization); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (mem.) (conclud-
ing that the President lacked congressional authority to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan by mili-
tary commission).
14 453 U.S. 654, 674, 678-79 (1981).
15 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,J., concurring).
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the President's foreign affairs powers.' 6 As congressional authoriza-
tion gains importance, the tools used to construe the scope of that
authorization do as well. 17 The confusion that Hamdi generates about
international law thus makes it difficult for the lower courts to resolve
cases effectively, for the President to know the scope of his own
authority, and for Congress to predict how courts and the President
will interpret its authorizations for the use of force.
Second, there is general disagreement around the value of inter-
national law as an interpretive norm in a number of different con-
texts. The Supreme Court has made recent, highly controversial ref-
erences to international and comparative sources to interpret the
Eighth1 8 and Fourteenth Amendments, 9 and courts have long used
international law to interpret statutes, even those that do not explic-
itly refer to it.20 The justification for and scope of such use is also the
subject of disagreement. 21 Some of the general criticisms leveled
16 See HAROLD HUNGJU KOH, THE NATIONAl. SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 105-13, 134-41 (1990) (discussing both cases and arguing
that the Court in Dames & Moore shoukl have demanded "more specific legislative approval
for the president's far-reaching measures"); Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's
Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 139-54 (2002) (discussing and criticizing this reasoning in
Youngstown and Dames & Moore); Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 401-26 (2002) (concluding that the concurring opinions in
Youngstown, considered in light of subsequent opinions and commentary, stand for the prin-
ciple that courts are not restricted to the language of enacted statutes in determining con-
gressional will regarding the President's actions).
17 See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the lar on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2-5, on file with author)
(arguing that the Authorization for Use of Military Force should receive more attention
from scholars in part because courts have generally resolved war powers cases based on
congressional authorization and avoided questions about the President's constitutional
power as Commander in Chief).
18 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005); id. at 1225-29 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Atkins -: Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002); see also Curtis A. Bradley,
The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 498-556 (2002); Harold
Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1085, 1109-29 (2002).
19 See, e.g., Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg,J., concurring); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah
Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARnOZO L. REV.
253, 282 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Inteipreta-
tion, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 82, 83-84, 89-90 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and
Domestic Rights: Reflections onAtkins and Lawrence, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 69, 70-72 (2004).
20 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
21 Compare Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statu-
tory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1152-62, 1165-73, 1176-79 (1990) (defending
broad application of the canon), with Curtis Bradley, The Charming Bets), Canon and Separa-
tion of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. LJ. 479, 484 (1998)
2005]
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against the interpretive value of international law include the claims
that its use lacks textual antecedent and may not reflect the intent of
Congress or the Framers, that norms developed in whole or in part
outside of the United States have little interpretive value, and that the
variety of sources in international law do little to constrain the courts'
decision making.2 2 Unfortunately, the plurality's loose reliance on in-
ternational law in Hamdi is open to some of these very criticisms.
Part I of this Article introduces the controversy surrounding the
use of international law to interpret statutes and the Constitution. 23
Part If analyzes the opinions in Hamdi and shows that the plurality
relied on international law to interpret the scope of Congress's
authorization without proper regard for its source, content, or inter-
pretive function, and concludes that this use of international law does
not effectively serve the interpretive purposes discussed in Part 1.24
Part III argues that international law has significant interpretive
value if it is used by the courts to limit the scope of congressional
authorization to those actions by the President that do not violate in-
ternational law.25 Part III first considers the following potential
justifications for using international law: (a) the text of the authoriza-
tion (or legislative history) invites recourse to international sources,
(b) international law is relevant in construing the intent of Congress
in passing the authorization, and (c) the application of international
law advances certain separation-of-powers values. 26 The last two
justifications are considered through the lens of the Charming Betsy
canon, pursuant to which the courts construe acts of Congress to avoid
violations of international law whenever possible. 27 Although the con-
text in which the canon is generally invoked is different in significant
respects from the one presented here, the basis for the canon and the
debate it has engendered nonetheless provide a useful framework in
which to consider the interpretive use of various kinds of international
law.
(arguing for a narrow canon justified largely on separation-of-powers grounds, not congres-
sional intent or respect for international law), andJonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age
of lnternational Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 215-17, 262-70 (1993) (arguing that the
canon should be abandoned).
22 See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
24 ,See infra notes 64-135 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 136-275 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 136-245 and accompanying text.
27 See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.
[Vol. 46:293
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As Part III illustrates, however, there are strong reasons to think
that this use of international law both reflects the preferences of Con-
gress and serves to foster separation of powers. 28 The participation of
the political branches in the development of international humanitar-
ian law, the formal and informal commitments made by the Executive
Branch to follow that law during armed conflict, the long-standing
nature of the Charming Betsy canon, and other factors all provide
sound reasons for the courts to conclude that general authorizations
for the use of force do not embrace violations of international law by
the President.2 9 Moreover, this use of international law arguably pro-
motes separation of powers by seeking specific authorization from
Congress for certain violations of international law rather than leav-
ing that decision in the hands of the courts or the President. 30
Finally, Part III concludes by revisiting the Hamdi case, and ex-
plains how the analysis laid out above would have strengthened the
plurality's opinion and better advanced many of the interpretive func-
tions of international law set forth in Part 1.31 Using two treaties as ex-
amples, this Part also considers how such a presumption would work
with respect to various sources of international law and particular
problems that might arise in those contexts.3 2
I. THE INTERPRETIVE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The basic principles of international law are well known, but a
brief review is nonetheless helpful to set the context for the discussion
that follows. Treaties are international agreements; in our constitu-
tional framework they require approval of the President and a super-
majority of the Senate.3 3 Self-executing treaties have effect as domestic
law without any implementing legislation. Non-self-executing treaties
are binding internationally, but require further legislative action to
become directly enforceable by U.S. courts. 34 Customary international
law is based on consistent practices that states follow out of a sense of
legal obligation.3 5 The status of customary international law in our
28 See infra notes 136-275 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 136-202 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 203-245 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 246-275 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 246-275 and accompanying text.
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3) (1987).
35 Id. § 102(2).
20051
HeinOnline  -- 46 B.C. L. Rev. 299 2004-2005
Boston College Law Review
domestic legal system is contested-some argue that it is federal law
that binds the states and provides a basis for the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, others argue that it is not, and still others take an in-
termediate position. 36 It is well settled, however, that the political
branches can override treaties and customary international law as
matters of domestic law if they choose to do so-a later-in-time stat-
ute, for example, can abrogate an earlier treaty or customary obliga-
tion.37 Comparative law refers generally to the practices of foreign
countries that are not binding on other countries as law.38
International law can, of course, serve as a binding norm that
provides the rule of decision in domestic litigation;39 this use of inter-
national law has provoked controversy over the past two decades. 40 To
36 Cf id. § 111 reporters' note 3 (stating that "the modern view is that customary in-
ternational law in the United States is federal law and its determination by the federal
courts is binding oil the State courts"). See generally Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing that customary international law is not federal com-
mon law); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824 (1998) (arguing that customary international law is federal common law); Michael D.
Ramsey, International Law as Non-Preemptive Federal Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 555 (2002) (tak-
ing an intermediate position); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary Inter-
national Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002) (describing this debate and also taking an in-
termediate position).
37 RFSTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TILE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115(a). The norm is still binding internationally. See id. § 115(b). Some commentators ar-
gue that customary international law overrides prior-enacted federal statutes. See, e.g., Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1563-67 (1984).
38 Although this Article touches on issues related to the use of foreign sources in gen-
eral, its focus is on international law. Some argue that a sharp distinction between interna-
tional and comparative law is descriptively inaccurate and normatively unattractive, and
that U.S. courts should make broad use of both as "transnational law," particularly in the
human rights context. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 43, 52-54 (2004). This Article focuses on international law, in part because that
is what the Supreme Court appeared to do in the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision, and in part
because there are particularly strong reasons to use certain types of international law to
interpret the scope of congressional authorization for the use of force. See infra notes 74-
121 and accompanying text (discussing Hamdi plurality opinion)- infra notes 164-275 and
accompanying text (discussing reasons to use international law to interpret congressional
authorization for the use of force).
39 See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135 (1989) (determining that
resolution of dispute between families of passengers and airline depended on terms of self-
executing treaties limiting liability of airlines in certain circumstances).
40 Examples include the scope and meaning of the Alien Tort Statute and whether
courts should enforce customary international law as binding on the President. See, e.g.,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754-69 (2004) (discussing the scope of the Alien
Tort Statute); id. at 2769-76 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(disagreeing with the Court's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute). See generally Garcia-
Mir v Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir. 1986) (addressing Customary international law);
[Vol. 46:293
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some extent, however, it may be fair to say that the interpretive use of
international law is now taking center stage, with disagreement about
its application arising in both constitutional4' and statutory interpreta-
tion. 42 Justifications for the interpretive use of international law in
both contexts fall into the following two very general (and somewhat
overlapping) categories: 43 (1) international law serves to interpret text
or otherwise maximize the preferences of the Framers (constitutional
or statutory), and (2) it promotes a broad range of normative values,
such as enhancing the international stature of the United States.
Debate around the first use of international law focuses on the ex-
tent to which it fairly captures the meaning of text or maximizes the
intent of the drafters." To the extent that it does, there seems to be
Jonathan I. Charney, Agora: May the President Violate International Law?, 80 AM. .INT'l L. 913
(1986) (same); Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 322 (1985) (same).
41 Supreme CourtJustices have sparred openly about the use of international and com-
parative law in interpreting the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997) (discussing the practice of euthanasia in the Nether-
lands in determining that state prohibition of physician-assisted suicide did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black,J., con-
curring) (relying in part on the United Nations Charter to strike down California's Alien
Land Law); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the
Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1043-46 (2002) (considering whether a proposed
application of the Thirteenth Amendment is consistent with international law); Note, Inter
national Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1751, 1762-65
(2003) (applying international law to the relationship between equal protection and the
trust doctrine in Indian law); supra notes 18-19. See generally Gordon A. Christenson, Using
Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3
(1983); Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Introduction-Agora: The United States
Constitution and International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'i. L. 42 (2004).
42 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-99 (1993); id. at 812-
22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Supreme Court's construction of the
Sherman Act based on principles of international law); Princz v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-75 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant had not waived
its sovereign immunity tinder a federal statute); id. at 1180-82 (Wald,J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the statute should be read in light of nonderogable norms of international human
rights law); see also Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1154 (7th Cir.
2001) (discussing this issue at length). For additional discussion of the use of international
law in statutory interpretation, see sources cited supra note 21.
43 International sources may also serve a functional role by providing a way to evaluate
empirical claims. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting); Koh, supra note 38, at 46.
44 In the context of constitutional interpretation, proponents of comparative and in-
ternational sources argue that language in the Constitution that implicitly refers to a
community standard, such as "cruel and unusual," and "due process," make modern inter-
national sources relevant. Koh, supra note 38, at 46. They also observe that jurists tradi-
tionally have looked outside the borders of the United States when interpreting the scope
of the Constitution. Id. at 45; see also Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 CotLUM. J.
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widespread agreement as to its interpretive value. 45 In the context of
statutory interpretation-which bears the closest relationship to inter-
preting the scope of authorizations by Congress for the use of force-
courts use international law when it is explicitly incorporated by the
statute. 46 Courts also construe statutes to avoid violations of interna-
tional law "where fairly possible" under the Charming Betsy canon,47 and
they generally presume that statutes do not apply extraterritorially, par-
ticularly where doing so might conflict with international law.4s Some
argue that the latter two uses of international law may fail, at least in
part, to reflect congressional intent, and that the canons must be
justified, if at all, on other grounds.49
TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 301-03 (2004); Daniel Bodansky, The Use ofInternational Sources in Con-
stitutional Opinion, 32 GA.J. INT'L & COmP. L. 421, 423-24 (2004).
45 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM.J. INT'L L. 57, 57-58 (2004) (arguing against the use of international sources in consti-
tutional interpretation in part because they fail to fit within traditional interpretive meth-
ods, including text); Ramsey, supra note 19, at 71 (criticizing the use of international prac-
tice and opinion in Lawnence v. Texas and Atkins v. Virginia, but noting that "[i]nternational
sources are obviously relevant to tile scope of the Constitttion's structural provisions
defining the international powers of the U.S. government"); Steinhardt, supra note 21, at
1185-86 (answering criticisms of the canon based in part on the ground that its use cap-
tures the intentions of Congress).
46 In this situation, of course, the relationship between international law and the text of
the enactment is clear. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-38 (1942) (interpreting the
"law of war" as used in the Articles of War); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000) (criminalizing
piracy as defined by the law of nations); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (3) (1994) (abrogating foreign sovereign immunity for cases in which "rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue"). International law is also used
in statutory interpretation when legislative history provides reason to do so, or when the
statutory language appears to refer to a term of art under international law. See, e.g., INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 435-40 (1987) (interpreting the Refugee Act in part based
on the definition of the term "refugee" in treaties to which the United States was a party).
47 RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.").
48 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991) (Aramco) (superseded by
statute at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)) (stating that "[w]ithout clearer evidence of con-
gressional intent to do so than is contained in the alien-exemption clatse, we are unwilling
to ascribe to that body a policy which would raise difficult issues of international law").
49 See Jonathan Turley, "Wien in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 655-60 (1990) (arguing that the courts
should reverse the presumption against extraterritoriality in part because it no longer
reflects the intentions of Congress); see also Bradley, supra note 21, at 517-23 (arguing that
some tses of the Charming Betsy canon may fail to capture the intentions of Congress);
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 85, 112-20 (1998) (arguing that some justifications for the presumption against
extraterritoriality fail to capture the intentions of Congress); infra notes 181-202 and ac-
companying text.
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The wide range of normative goals that may be advanced by the
interpretive use of international and comparative law is also the sub-
ject of debate and criticism. Some argue that using international
sources strengthens transnational norms themselves,50 promotes the
ability of the United States to influence the development of those
norms, 51 increases U.S. compliance with international law,52 enhances
the ability of the United States to protect its own interests abroad,
53
may elicit clear preferences from law makers,54 and promotes separa-
tion of powers.55 Critics focus on the development of international law
in part outside the United States. 56 They also argue that the content
of international law (particularly that of customary international law)
is indeterminate and amorphous,57 leaving too much discretion in the
hands ofjudges rather than lawmakers. 58 Finally, and related to all of
50 Koh, supra note 38, at 53-54 (stating that "domestic courts must play a key role in
coordinating U.S. domestic constitutional rules with rules of foreign and international law,
not simply to promote American aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-
functioning international judicial system").
51 Amann, supra note 44, at 285, 307-08 (noting that the use of international norms in
constitutional interpretation enhances the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's decisions
both inside and outside the United States); Neuman, supra note 19, at 87 ("The Supreme
Court has been a prestigious source of individual rights doctrines and argumentation in
the global community. But if the Court insists on the exceptional character of its rights
conceptions... then it will undermine the bases of its influence.").
52 Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1127-29.
53 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91, 103-04 (2004);
Amann, supra note 44, at 285, 308-09; Neuman, supra note 19, at 87.
54 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 2162,
2235-48 (2002) (defending the presumption against extraterritoriality as a tool for elicit-
ing legislative preferences and suggesting that the presumption in favor of international
law may serve the same function).
55 Bradley, supra note 21, at 532-33 (justifying the Charming Betsy canon based in part
on its promotion of separation of powers); Dodge, supra note 49, at 120-24 (evaltating the
separation-of-powers rationale for the presumption against extraterritoriality); Steinhardt,
supra note 21, at 1129-34 (discussing the separation-of-powers basis for the canon).
56 Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 104-06; Turley, supra note 21, at 205.
57 Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1154 (referring to the "chameleon qualities" of customary in-
ternational law); Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA
L. REv. 665, 715-16 (1986) (describing some understandings of customary international
law as amorphous and in flux); Young, supra note 36, at 385 (explaining that "it is very
difficult to actually determine whether a given norm satisfies the traditional requirements
for customary international law"). Contra Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1186-87 (emphasiz-
ing the fact-dependent nature of customary international law); Beth Stephens, The Law of
Our Land, Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393,
455 (1997) (emphasizing the limited number of customary international law norms).
58 See Turley, supra note 21, at 265 (arguing that because there are so many sources of
international law, the presumption in favor of international law can trump rival interpre-
tive methods in virtually every case); see also Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Anti-
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the foregoing, critics object to international law even when used as an
interpretive (rather than rule-of-decision) norm, on the grounds that
it is counter-majoritarian 59 and antidemocratic.60
Although some of these problems may be especially acute in the
context of interpretive canons, 6' the plurality opinion in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld itself illustrates some of these difficulties. In general, it failed
to provide a convincing link between congressional intent and its use
of international law.62 Moreover, by not distinguishing among various
kinds of international law, or various interpretive uses, the opinion
left open the potential use of a very broad range of interpretive
sources for a very broad set of purposes. The plurality's use of inter-
national law also undermines, or at least fails to serve, many of the
normative values outlined above. Its failure to focus on the content
and context of international law, for example, and its lack of attention
to potential violations of international law could actually serve to re-
tard the development of international law and degrade the interna-
tional stature of the United States. 63
trust, 43 WM. & MARY L. Riv. 627, 713, 720 (2001) (reasoning that "[c]ustom's innate sub-
jectivity surely raises serious questions regarding thejudiciary's role").
59 Alford, supra note 45, at 58-61 (making this argument in the context of constitu-
tional interpretation); Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1183-87 (noting and responding to
this objection with respect to the Charming Betsy canon).
60 Aleinikoff, supra note 53, at 104-06 (describing the tension between narratives of
popular sovereignty and international law); Turley, supra note 21, at 204-10 (discussing
the differences between pluralistic and countermajoritarian objections to the use of inter-
national law as an interpretive norm, and arguing that some uses raise pluralistic concerns
because the norms have been developed outside the democratic process involved in pass-
ing legislation in the United States); see also Young, supra note 36, at 398-400 (describing
this objection to the use of customary international law as federal common law). But see
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Pro-
fessors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDIHAM L. REV. 371, 384-85 (1997) (countering in part
that the federal government participates in the formation of customary international law).
61 Turley, supra note 21, at 265-66 (arguing that the Charming Betsy canon should be
jettisoned in part because it presents the "potential for outcome selection and judicial
bias" and that courts should consider the use of international law in statutory interpreta-
tion on a case-by-case basis). See generally Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewel-
lyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. RE'. 561, 563 (1992) (describ-
ing various problems with canons of statutory interpretation).
62 See infra notes 74-121 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 74-121 and accompanying text.
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERPRETIVE PITFALLS:
HAMDI V. RUMSFELD
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in Afghanistan in
2001 and eventually transferred to a naval brig in Charleston, South
Carolina, where he was detained by the U.S. government as an "enemy
combatant."64 A habeas petition challenged his detention, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the President had
the power to detain Hamdi because he was captured in a "zone of ac-
tive combat operations."65
The Supreme Court issued four separate opinions in Iandi v.
Rumsfeld, none of which commanded a majority. The plurality opinion,
authored by justice Sandra Day O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist as well as Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen
Breyer, concluded that Congress had authorized the President to de-
tain U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants," but that due process entitled
Hamdi to a hearing to confirm the factual basis for the detention. 66
The plurality found congressional authorization for detentions, includ-
ing those of U.S. citizens, based on the September 2001 Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (the "AUMF"), which permitted the
President to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against persons
who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."67
Justice Thomas agreed that Congress had authorized the detention
64 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635-36 (2004) (O'ConnorJ., plurality opin-
ion). For the plurality's definition of the term "enemy combatant," see infra note 74. The
government has since released Hamdi and returned him to Saudi Arabia.
65 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cii; 2003) (reversing district court's or-
der directing the government to produce information and ordering Handi's petition dis-
missed), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The Fourth Circuit denied rehear-
ing en banc. Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 340 (en banc) (denying rehearing). Judges Luttig, Motz,
King, and Gregory voted to grant rehearing en banc;Judges Luttig and Motz filed dissent-
ing opinions. Id.
6Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635 (O'ConnorJ, plurality opinion).
67 Id. at 2639-40 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion); see Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF in part provides the following:
(a) IN GENERAL.-That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
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(providing the fifth vote for this conclusion), but disagreed that a hear-
ing was required.68
Justice David Souter, joined by justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, con-
cluded that the AUMF did not authorize the detention of Hamdi and
that the President otherwise lacked the authority to detain him, but
nonetheless joined Justice O'Connor's opinion ordering a hearing
(providing the fifth and sixth votes for this conclusion). 69 In part, Jus-
tice Souter relied on the language of a 1971 federal statute providing
that "no citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained except
pursuant to an Act of Congress."70 Although the plurality found that
the AUMF satisfied this statute, Justice Souter disagreed.7' Justice An-
tonin Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, concluded that only
by suspending the writ of habeas corpus could Congress authorize the
detention of U.S. citizens, but that in any event Congress had not pro-
vided any specific authorization for the detentions. 72
Thus, congressional authorization for the detentions was the ful-
crum upon which the Supreme Court opinions turned; it was this is-
sue that divided the Court five to four. In fact, the five Justices who
found sufficient congressional authorization explicitly disavowed
reaching any conclusions about the scope of the President's plenary
power as Commander in Chief.73 International law, in turn, played an
important role in how the various opinions interpreted the scope of
congressional authorization.
68 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2652-53 (SouterJ., concurring in part, dissenting iii part, and concurring in
thejudgment).
70 d. (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judg-
ment) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (1971)).
71 Id. at 2653-59 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
thejudgment).
72 Id. at 2671-72 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
73 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (noting, and refising to
reach, government's argument that the President has plenary authority and thus needs no
congressional authorization for Hamdi's detention); id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(same). To the extent that the plurality found the President's authority limited by the
scope of congressional authorization, however, it must have concluded implicitly that the
President lacked the requisite plenary authority. For example, the plurality concluded that
the President lacked the authority to detain individuals indefinitely because Congress had
not authorized such detentions; if the President had plenary authority, however, he could
have taken the action even without authorization by Congress. See Sarah Cleveland, Our
International Constitution (manuscript at 73, on file with author) (discussing interna-
tional law and constitutional interpretation in the Hamdi opinion). It is unclear whether
the plurality thought that indefinite detentions violate 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (although this
seems implicit from their opinion), or whether the plurality thought that such detentions
just lacked congressional authorization.
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A. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion
The plurality reached its conclusion about the scope of the
AUMF in three steps, and international law played a role at each
stage. The plurality concluded first that the detention of "enemy
combatants" 74 was "so fundamental and accepted an incident to war"
as to come within Congress's authorization for the use of "necessary
and appropriate force" in the AUMF. 75 The opinion directly cited only
one source for this conclusion, Ex parte Quirin.76 In Quirin, the Court
upheld the trial by military commission of a U.S. citizen charged with
violating the law of war77 based on a federal statute providing such
trials for those who "by the law of war may be triable by such military
commissions. '" 78 The language in Quirin to which the Hamdi plurality
cited discusses at length the law-of-war distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants; this distinction was important in Quirin because
unlawful combatants were subject to trial by military commission. 79
The plurality then cited three other sources for the purposes of mili-
tary detention-a post-Civil War treatise on military law by William
Winthrop, a 1946 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and a recent law review article quoting from the Nuremburg
tribunals that followed World War 11.80 All three relied on interna-
tional law. Based on these four sources the plurality concluded that
detention is a "fundamental and accepted" incident of war.81
74 The plurality defined "enemy combatant" narrowly (for the purposes of this case) as
someone who was part of (or supporting) hostile forces in Afghanistan and who engaged
in "'armed conflict against the United States."' Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (O'Connor, j.,
plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for Respondents at *3, Hanidi %% Runsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020).
75 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion).
76 Id. (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion) (citing 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
77 The term "law of war" refers to a subset of international law that governs both the
lawful use of force ("jus ad bellum") and the rules governing conduct during war ('jus in
be/lo"). 'Jus in bello" is also termed "international humanitarian law." See Steven R. Ratner,
Jus ad Bellum andjus in Bello After September 11, 96 Am.J. INT'L L. 905, 905-06 (2002).
78 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28. The Quirin opinion refused to consider what authority the
President would have had absent congressional authorization. Id. at 29; see also A. Christo-
pher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 309, 326-30 (2003) (analyz-
ing the opinion and emphasizing its narrow scope).
79 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28-31; infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
80 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing In re Territo, 156
F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788
(2d ed. 1920); and Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner of-War Status, 84 INT'i, RE'. RED CROSS
571, 572 (2002) (quoting Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1,
1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 229 (1947))).
81 Id. (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion).
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Second, the plurality reasoned, there is "no bar" to the United
States detaining its own citizens as enemy combatants, and therefore
the AUMF authorized such detentions.8 2 The plurality cited two
authorities for this proposition-a discussion in Quiin concluding
that U.S. citizenship does not preclude status as an enemy belligerent
or an unlawful combatant,8 3 and the Lieber Code from the Civil War
directing that captured rebels be treated as "prisoners of war."8 4 On
this basis, the plurality reached the conclusion central to the case: the
AUMF authorized the detention of citizens, thus meeting the re-
quirements of the 1971 statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).8 5 Fi-
nally, the plurality reasoned that "indefinite detention" for the pur-
poses of interrogation was inconsistent with the law of war and thus
not authorized by the AUMF. 86 The following discussion analyzes each
of these three conclusions in detail, considering in particular the reli-
ance of the plurality on international law.
1. Detention as a "Fundamental Incident" of War
The plurality relied directly on Quiin87 for its conclusion that the
detention of enemy combatants is a "fundamental" and "accepted"
82 Id. at 2640-41 (O'ConnorJ, plurality opinion).
83 Id. at 2640 (O'Connor, j., plurality opinion) (citing Quinn, 317 U.S. at 37-38). The
fill passage from Quinn reads as follows:
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in viola-
tion of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm
of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this
country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of
the Hague Convention and the law of war.
Quifin, 317 U.S. at 37-38.
84 Hamndi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing FRANcIs LIEBER,
WAR DEP'T, GEN. ORDER No. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD para. 153 (1863), reprinted in 2 FRANCiS LIEBER, MISCELLA-
NEOUS WRITINGS 273 (1881)).
85 Id. at 2641 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The opinions by justices Souter and
Scalia disagreed with this conclusion. Id. at 2653-59 (SouterJ., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part, and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2671-72 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
86 Id. at 2641-42 (O'Conrorj., plurality opinion).
87 Id. at 2640 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citing 317 U.S. at 28). In addition to
the difficulties with the plurality's reliance on Quirin discussed below, there are other,
more general reasons to treat the Quinin precedent with great care. The opinion itself was
drafted months after the Stprene Court's order was issued, and six of the eight petition-
ers had already been executed. See Bryant & Tobias, supra note 78, at 330. In addition, the
Court had air extraordinarily difficult time drafting an opinion to justify its order, id. at
323-26, and the Justices had been inappropriately pressured by President Franklin Roose-
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part of war, and it relied on other sources to explain the purposes of
military detention. There are significant problems, however, with both
Quirin and the other sources.
a. Ex Parte Quirin
Quoting from Quirin, the plurality reasoned that "[t]he capture
and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and
trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,'
are 'important incident[s] of war."' 88 The "important incident[s] of
war" language from Quirin refers to those who violate the law of war. It
does not explicitly mention detention; instead, it refers to the power
to "seize and subject to disciplinary measures."8 9
A page and a half later, the Quirin opinion used the second
phrase quoted by the plurality, "universal agreement and practice," in
the following context: "By universal agreement and practice, the law
of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful
populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants."90 Neither distinction makes the
point for which the Hamdi plurality cited this language-detention is
a fundamental part of warfare. Quirin does note in dicta that both law-
velt, id. at 319-20, 331. Justices Felix Frankfurter and William Douglas later distanced
themselves from the opinion, id. at 331, and more recentlyJustice Scalia noted that Quirin
was not the Court's "finest honr" Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2669 (ScaliaJ., dissenting opinion).
88 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion) (quoting Quiin, 317 U.S.
at 28).
89 The relevant language in Quiin is as follows:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by
the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize
and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to
thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.
317 U.S. at 28-29.
90 317 U.S. at 30-31 (citation omitted). Although the plurality opinion cited only to
page 28 of Quiin for this point, the language "universal agreement and practice" actually
appears on page 30. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Quirin,
317 U.S. at 30. The omitted citation refers to the following authorities:
Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295; Great Britain,
War Office, Manual of Military Law (1929) ch. xiv, §§ 17-19; German General
Staff, Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (1902) ch. 1; 7 Moore, Digest of Interna-
tional Law, § 1109; 2 Hyde, International Law (1922) § 653-54; 2 Oppen-
heim, International Law (6th Ed. 1940) § 107; Bluntschli, Droit International
(5th ed. tr. Lardy) §§ 531-32; 4 Calvo, Le Droit International Theoriqiue et
Pratique (5th ed. 1896) §§ 2034-35.
Quiin, 317 U.S. at 30 n.7.
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ful and unlawful combatants may be detained, and that unlawful
combatants may be tried by military commissions.91 Again, however,
the authorities cited in support (international law treatises and prac-
tice manuals from other countries) 92 do not mention detentions; they
focus on the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants. 93
This distinction tracks the authorization that Congress provided for
the trial of those who "by the law of war may be triable by such mili-
tary commissions."9 4
There are at least three problems with this reliance on Quirin.
First, it provides weak support for the plurality's conclusion- Quirin
itself considered only military trials and detention in anticipation of
such trials, for which Congress had provided specific authorization
based on the law of war. Not surprisingly, the sources upon which
Quiin relied have little direct bearing on detention itself.
Second, the law of war distinction emphasized in Quirin between
lawful and unlawful combatants undermines the plurality's reasoning.
The plurality reached no conclusion as to Hamdi's combatant status;
91 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
92 See id. at 31 n.8. The Quirin opinion cited the following authorities:
Great Britain, War Office, Manual of Military Law, ch. xiv, §§ 445-451; Rego-
lamento di Servizio in Guerra, § 133, 3 Leggi e Decreti del Regno d'talia
(1896) 3184; 7 Moore, Digest of International Law, § 1109; 2 Hyde, Interna-
tional Law, §§ 654, 652; 2 Halleck, International Law (4th Ed. 1908) § 4;
2 Oppenheim, International Law, § 254; Hall, International Law, §§ 127, 135;
Baty & Morgan, War, Its Conduct and Legal Results (1915) 172; Bluntschli,
Droit International, §§ 570 bis.
Id.
93 Section 1109 of John Bassett Moore's Digest of International Law discusses the distinc-
tion between private citizens and combatants, and between those combatants who are pro-
tected by the law of war and those who are not. 7JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAl. LAW § 1109, at 172-77 (1906). The treatise by Professor Charles Cheney Hyde
discusses whether guerilla hands and armed prowlers qualify as prisoners of war and
whether noncombatant members of the armed forces so qualify. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 652,
at 296-97, § 654, at 298-99 (1922). The referenced section in Major-General H.W. Halleck's
treatise distinguishes between private citizens and combatants. 2 H.W HALLECK, INTERNA-
TIONAl. LAW § 2, at 2 (4th ed. 1908). Professor L. Oppenheim's work distinguishes between
hostilities committed by armed forces and those committed by private individuals; the latter
may usually be tried as war criminals. 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE
§ 254, at 455-46 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 6th ed. 1940). Willian Edward Hall's treatise also
distinguishes between nonconlbatants and combatants and discusses punishments available
to those who violate the law of war. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 127, at
133-34, § 135, at 351-53 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1880). T. Baty andJ.H. Morgan distin-
guish between the treatment of combatants and noncombatants. 1. BATY & J.H. MORGAN,
WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND LEGAL RESULTS 172 (1915). None mentions detention.
91 Quitin, 317 U.S. at 27-28.
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it did not decide, in other words, whether he was a lawful or unlawful
combatant,95 although the government has treated him as an unlawful
combatant. This may seem to matter little, if indeed both lawful and
unlawful combatants may be detained, with lawful combatants pro-
tected as prisoners of war and unlawful combatants detained without
such protections. But detention as a lawful combatant during World
War II (when Quiin was decided) meant that international law pro-
vided an extensive set of regulations governing the terms of that de-
tention.96 Detention as an unlawful combatant at that time meant that
one fell largely outside the protections of the law of war and was at the
"mercy" of one's captors;97 this system was designed to protect civilians
95 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 n.2. Hamdi did not argue that he qualified for prisoner-of-
war status. Instead, he argued that the Geneva Conventions entitled him to a hearing. See
Cleveland, supra note 73 (manuscript at 73). The point here is not necessarily that the
Supreme Court should have decided his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status, but instead
that absent such a determination many of the sources relied upon by the pltrality are of
questionable relevance to the scope of the AUMF
96 See generally Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention] and its annexed
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land [hereinafter Hague Regu-
lations]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929,
47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Convention]. The Hague Regula-
tions defined those detainees eligible for prisoner-of-war status and provided rules govern-
ing their detention, including their right to personal belongings (Article 4), to treatment
"on the same footing as the troops of the Government who captured them" (Article 7),
and to the free exercise of religion (Article 18). 1907 Hague Convention, supra, art. 4, 36
Stat. 2296; id. art. 7, 36 Stat. 2297; id. art. 18, 36 Stat. 2301. The 1929 Geneva Convention
provided even more comprehensive protections to prisoners of war. See Horst Fischer, Pro-
tection of Prisoners of War, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS
321, 322-23 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). The United States is a party to both the 1929 Geneva
Convention and the 1907 Hague Convention. See generally 1929 Geneva Convention, supra;
1907 Hague Convention, supra. In 1949, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War replaced the 1929 Geneva Convention between contracting parties and
complemented sections of the Hague Regulations. See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Third Geneva Convention]; see also Territo, 156 F.2d at 146-47 (considering some of the
terms of the 1929 Geneva Convention); OPPENHEIM, supra note 93, §§ 127-132, at 299-306
(discussing the relationship between the 1909 Hague Convention and the 1929 Geneva
Convention, and exploring the coverage of both).
97 The Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva Convention provided protections only
for those who qualified as prisoners of war; others fell outside the scope of these treaties.
Hague Regulations, supra note 96; 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 96; see BATY &
MORGAN, supra note 93, at 172, 195-96 (noting that the unlawful combatant "exposes him-
self to the certainty" of death because he is not entitled to the protections of the law of war
and further noting that spies are unprotected by international law and are "to be shot");
HALL, supra note 93, § 135, at 351-53 (noting that for universally-recognized acts of unlaw-
ful belligerency prisoners "may be abandoned without hesitation to the fate which they
deserve" and that death may be appropriate even for less well-recognized unlawful acts,
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and other belligerents by providing incentives for combatants to
properly identify themselves. 98 Thus, the plurality, by reference to
Quiin, relied on international law, but that law (as it existed during
World War II) provided no affirmative sanction for, or regulation of,
the detention of unlawful combatants. This body of law was used to
justify the detention of Hamdi as an unlawful combatant, but such
detention would have fallen largely outside its purview.
International humanitarian law has changed dramatically since
World War II, and this leads to the third problem with the plurality's
reliance on Quiin and the law of war. The law of war, particularly the
Geneva Conventions of 1949,99 now provides greater protections to a
much larger group of prisoners than it did during World War 11.100
including the failure to distinguish oneself adequately as a combatant); OPPENHEIM, supra
note 93, §§ 251-257, at 451-59 (defining war crimes to include acts of unlawful belliger-
ency and noting that such crimes may be punished by death or "a more lenient punish-
ment"); Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
1025, 1026 (2004) ("'Through World War I1, international law permitted armies to deal
harshly with unlawful combatants, even allowing them to be shot after capture."); Derek
Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367, 368-70 (2004) (col-
lecting sources, including the Lieber Code, which provided that those who engaged in
hostilities but were not prisoners of war could be "captured and summarily shot").
98 As one author explained shortly after the end of World War 11, "International law
deliberately neglects to protect unprivileged belligerents because of the danger their acts
present to their opponent." Thus, such belligerents "do not benefit from any comprehen-
sive scheme of protection." Major Richard R. Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency"
Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 323, 343 (1951).
99 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 96; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]
[all four collectively hereinafter 1949 Geneva Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of' 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; see L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW oF ARMED CONFLICT 43-46, 50-52 (2d ed. 2000) (describing tile expanded pro-
tections provided by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Protocols).
100 The most significant changes to the types of protected persons include those pro-
vitled by Article 3 (which is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions), the
Fourth Geneva Convention, and Articles 43, 45, and 75 of Protocol I. Common Article 3
expanded the type of conflict to which basic international humanitarian protections ap-
plied by providing minimum protections to certain persons detained in "armed conflict
not of an international character." First Geneva Convention, supra note 99, art. 3, 6 U.S.T.
at 3116-18; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 99, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22; Third
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Again, the difficulty in Hamdi is that the government has not admitted
that any of these protections apply to his detention. 10' It is one thing
Geneva Convention, supra note 96, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20; Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 99, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20; see aso JEAN DE PREUX, INT'i. COMM. OF THE Ren
CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMINr Or, PRISON-
ERS OF WAR 27-44 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960) (detailing the efforts of
the International Committee of the Red Cross to expand international humanitarian law
to apply to civil wars and other non-international conflicts). The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion provides extensive protections to some prisoners who are not covered by the other
three Geneva Conventions. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 99, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at
3520. Protocol I expanded the definition of prisoner of war (articles 43, 44) and the pro-
tections afforded those who are not prisoners of war (Article 44), including basic mini-
mum protections for any detainee not otherwise entitled to more favorable treatment
under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I (Article 75). Protocol I, supra note 99 arts.
43, 44, 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23-24, 37-38. The foregoing description is an obvious over-
simplification of a very complicated set of interrelated treaty protections. Professors L.C.
Green and DerekJinks provide additional detail. See GREEN, supra note 99, at 229-43, 317-
20. See generally Jinks, supra note 97. Professor Jinks argues that the Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols provide substantial protections to all detainees, thus diminishing the
importance of prisoner-of-war status.Jinks, supra note 97, at 380-413.
101 See Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to National Security Advisors 1
(Feb. 7, 2002) (stating that "common Article 3 of Geneva does tiot apply to either al Qaeda
or Taliban detainees" in part because the "relevant conflicts are international in scope"),
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (date re-
leasedJune 22, 2004). ContraJinks, supra note 97, at 399-405, 421-22 (arguing that Common
Article 3 protects unlawful combatants in international disputes); Jordan J. Paust, Judicial
Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
503, 512-13 n.29 (2003) (arguing that Common Article 3 protects prisoners like Hamdi).
Citizens of the United States like Hamdi, who are detained by the U.S. government, fall
outside the definition of a protected person under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 99, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520 (protecting those who
"at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves ... in the hands of a
Party ... of which they are not nationals"). Although Part 11 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention appears to apply without regard to nationality, it is unclear that any of the protec-
tions in that Part apply to detention. See id. art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3526-28. The United States
has also suggested that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies only to "civilian non-
combatants." See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Fact
Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). ContraJinks, supra
note 97, at 381-86 (concluding that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to unlawful
combatants). The United States is not a party to Protocol I and has specifically objected to
its expanded protections of certain kinds of combatants. See Douglas J. Feith, Protocol I:
Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 AKRON L. REV. 531, 534 (1986) ("It bears stressing
that the essence of humanitarian law is the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. And the essence of terrorism is the negation of the distinction. Protocol I in
effect blesses the negation."); Guy B. Roberts, The New Rules .or Waging War: The Case
Against Ratification of Additional Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'I. L. 109, 127-34 (1985) (arguing
against according combatant status to guerrillas or others "not identifiable as part of a
readily distinguishable military unit"). The United States, however, has suggested that it
may view Article 75 as customary international law. SeeJinks, supra note 97, at 431 n.359. It
has not suggested, however, that it is bound by such law in its treatment of Hamdi. At times
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to reason that Congress authorized the President to detain in ways
affirmatively sanctioned and regulated (and thus also limited) by the
law of war; it is quite another to rely on some law-of-war authorities to
support the claim of congressional authorization for a detention that
purportedly falls outside the scope of those authorities.
b. Other Sources
The plurality opinion in Hamdi cited three sources that describe
the purpose of military detention, again to support the proposition
that detention is a "fundamental" part of warfare. The only case, In re
Territo, involved an American citizen captured while fighting for Italy
during World War II and detained as a prisoner of war.102 The Ninth
Circuit's language in Territo discussing the purpose of detention is un-
supported by any other authority.10 3 Moreover, the detention of
the United States has all but acknowledged that (under its approach) the detainees fall
outside the law of war. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Excep-
tion and the 7 inptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONsr. L. 1001, 1056 n.217 (2004). Professor
Kim Lane Scheppele provides the following description of a press conference held by for-
mer White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer:
A reporter, exasperated at not getting a straight answer about whether the de-
tainees were covered by the Geneva Convention or not, asked, 'There's no in-
ternational convention or there's no law on which we're detaining them, it's ba-
sically, they're dangerous, they want to kill Americans, and we're going to keep
them in detention." And Fleischer seemed to grant the point in his answer:
"[P]ut it this way: There's a war in Afghanistan. These people did not stop
fighting; it was either be killed or be captured. These people were captured."
Id. (citing Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, White House (Jan. 9, 2002)).
102 156 F.2d at 143.
103 The sentence in Territo to which the Hamdi plurality cited reads in full as follows:
'The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy. He is
disarmed and from then on he must be removed as completely as practicable from the
front, treated humanely [FNI] and in time exchanged, repatriated [FN2] or otherwise
released." Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Territo, 156 F.2d at
145. Territo does cite purported support for the proposition that prisoners must be treated
humanely. Footnote I cites "Floury, Prisoner of War, p. 15; Hall Int. Law, pp. 490-497; Op-
penheim Int. Law, Vol. 1I, pp. 216-218; Rex v. Shiever, 97 Eng. Repts. 551. As to Prisoners of
War, see Hyde Int. Law, Sec. 675, p. 1859." The referenced pages in William Edward Hall's
International Law appear irrelevant. See HALL, supra note 93, §§ 204-207, at 490-97. The
relevant pages in Professor Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise discuss at length when
a neutral acquires enemy status under international law; page 216 does not state that puni-
tive measures are not permitted against such persons. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 93, § 88, at
216-18. Section 675 of Professor Hyde's International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by
the United States (which is not on page 1859) discusses situations under which people lose
their "belligerent qualifications," and thus their right to treatment as prisoners of war. See
HYDE, supra note 93, § 675, at 344-45. People in an occupied territory who rise up against
the occupier, for example, are not so entitled and may "suffer death" if captured. The Eng-
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Hamdi differs from that of Territo in a significant way that bears par-
ticularly on the scope of the AUMF. Territo was detained pursuant to
the 1929 Geneva Convention, 104 a treaty ratified by the President and
a supermajority of the Senate. 10 5 Not only did his detention thus fall
within a carefully structured international legal framework, but the
President and the Senate had also specifically considered and author-
ized the terms of that detention when they approved the 1929 treaty.
Hamdi, however, was not detained pursuant to a treaty, and the terms
and conditions of his detention thus lacked the imprimatur of any
prior Senate and presidential authorization.
The citations by the plurality to works by Yasmin Naqvi and Wil-
liam Winthrop underscore this loose approach to international law.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, originally published after the
Civil War, has become an important reference work for American
courts and commentators. 10 6 The section from which the plurality
quoted cites manuals of international law,107 but it is unclear whether
the plurality viewed the work as a guide to nineteenth-century Ameri-
can practice or as a reflection of international norms and why either
is probative of modern practice. The discussion in Naqvi is devoted
entirely to the treatment of prisoners of war.10 8
One might argue that the references to international law in this
part of the plurality's opinion are only indirect, and that they are im-
portant because they have become incorporated into Executive
lish case from 1759, Rex v. Shiever, considered the detention of a Swedish man. 97 Eng. Rep.
551, 551-52 (1759). Sweden was neutral, but the prisoner had been caught in the service of
a French privateer and the court held that he was properly held as a prisoner of war. Id.
These sources say little about either the purposes or conditions of detention, although they
do outline ways in which neutrals attain enemy status. Footnote 2 cites only to sources that
govern prisoners of war.
104 See Territo, 156 F.2d at 144.
105 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
106 See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 761 (1995) (citing WINTHROP, supra
note 80, for the history of militaryjustice); United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11,
15 n.8 (1955) (citing WINTHROP, supra note 80, as a leading authority on military law);
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-47 n.9 (1952) (citing WINTHutOP, supra note 80, on
the history and scope of military commissions); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 32-33 n.10, 35-36 n. 12
(citing WINTHROP, supra note 80, for the history of military cotnmissions and to interpret
the law of war); Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 386 (1920) (citing WINTHROP, supra note
80, to interpret the Articles of War); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 386 (1902) (cit-
ing WINTHROP, supra note 80, for "military usage and procedure").
107 This discussion in Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents cited to "Manual, Laws of
War, Part I--of Prisoners of War" published in 1880 by the Institute of International Law,
and to the Lieber Code used by Union forces during the Civil War. See WINTHROP, supra
note 80, at 788.
108 Naqvi, supra note 80, at 572.
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Branch practice or U.S. case law, not because they have anything to do
with international law. There are several difficulties with this argu-
ment, however. First, if these sources are important only as guides to
U.S. practice, then the plurality opinion is remarkably weak. It is hard
to see how dicta from a 1942 Supreme Court case (that involved mili-
tary trials) and dicta from a 1946 Ninth Circuit case (that involved
only detention of prisoners of war), coupled with a law review article
from the International Red Cross and a Civil War-era treatise, could
possibly show that detention is part of Executive Branch practice or a
"fundamental incident of war" in 2004. Instead, these sources support
the plurality's opinion in part because they, in turn, reflect interna-
tional law and practice, as the plurality opinion makes clear with its
references to the "law of war."109 Second, because the key question is
the scope of authorization by Congress, it is difficult to see why the
Hague and 1929 Geneva Conventions are relevant based only on their
citation in 7Trito-a Ninth Circuit opinion from 1946-rather than
based on their status as treaties under the Supremacy Clause, or based
on the agreement of the Senate and President to the norms included
in those treaties. Finally, to argue that the plurality refers to these in-
ternational norms because they are already part of U.S. case law leads
to the odd conclusion that the use of international sources is frozen,
and the Court may rely only on those that it has already cited. Of
course, the plurality opinion in Ilamdi itself undermines such a con-
clusion by citing the 1949 Geneva Conventions, concluded after
Quirin and 7rrito--this leaves open the question of how exactly those
Conventions are relevant, and whether manuals illustrating foreign
practice (like those upon which Quiin relied) should have equal
weight.
2. "No Bar" to Detentions of U.S. Citizens
The weaknesses in the plurality's approach become even more
acute when it considers the following critical question about congres-
sional authorization: does the AUMF authorize the detention of U.S.
citizens? Here, the plurality drew explicitly from the law of war, reason-
ing (based on Quirin and the Lieber Code) that it provides "no bar" to
the detention of U.S. citizens.110 Although the preceding part of the
109 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (O'ConnorJ, plurality opinion).
110 Id. at 2640-41 (O'ConnorJ, plurality opinion). The full passage from Quirin reads
as follows:
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plurality opinion used international law to determine what activities
are "fundamental" to war, this discussion used international law not to
show that detaining one's own citizens is "fundamental" to the con-
duct of war, but to show that it is not foreclosed by the law of war.11
In terms of interpreting the text of the AUMF, the difference is
important. In the latter situation, the law of war is used to enhance
the scope of authorization to embrace everything that is not
specifically prohibited by the law of war; the former reads the authori-
zation to embrace only conduct that qualifies as "fundamental" to
waging war. Unlike the detention of armed combatants in general, it
is hard to see how the detention of one's own citizens is a "fundamen-
tal incident" of international armed conflict. 112 This is a far broader
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him
from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in viola-
tion of the law of war. Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm
of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this
country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of
the Hague Convention and the law of war.
317 U.S. at 37-38.
HI See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion).
112 The laws governing the conduct of war, or jus in bello, developed largely around in-
ternational conflict and were designed to mitigate the harms inflicted by one country oil
the nationals of another country. See Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and
Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFI.ICT 1, 11 (Dieter
Fleck ed., 1995) ("For the most part, humanitarian law does not attempt to regulate a
state's treatment of its own citizens."). For example, although international law generally
affords lawful combatants protection front criminal prosecution (for their lawful use of
force), international law does not prevent a nation from criminally prosecuting its own
citizens for treason (or other crimes) when they take tip arms against it. GREEN, supra note
99, at 119-20 (noting that deserters "are entitled to receive from the soldiers capturing
them the same treatment as any other captive" although under national law they may be
tried for treason); HOWARD S. LEV1E, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 74-76 (1977) (arguing that any detainee should be protected by international
law regardless of nationality, but that the Detaining Power can charge him with treason
under its municipal law and "try him in accordance with the guarantees contained in the
relevant provisions of the Convention"); OPPENHEIM, supra note 93, § 86, at 213 (indicat-
ing that "traitorous subjects" who "fight in the armed forces of the enemy" cannot claim
the privileges of the law of war; instead "[t]hey may be, and always are, treated as crimi-
nals"). There is even some question as to whether the Third Geneva Convention applies at
all when a country detains one of its own nationals. Both Territo and Justice Souter's opin-
ion in Hamdi suggest that it does. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2457-60 (Souter, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); Territo, 156 F.2d at 145 (in-
terpreting the 1929 Geneva Convention). In its brief in Hamdi, the government argued
that the Third Geneva Convention did not protect Hamdi but did not mention this argu-
ment. See Respondents' Brief at *22-24, Hamdi (No. 03-6696). Nevertheless, there are
some good reasons to think that the Third Geneva Convention does not protect people
detained by governments of which they are nationals. See Amann, supra note 1;Jinks, supra
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use of international law that potentially invites reliance on a wide va-
riety of sources. Indeed, the only evidence the plurality cited to sup-
port reading the AUMF to include such detentions is that the law of
nations posed "no bar" to this interpretation, 13 coupled with the pur-
poses of detention itself.
3. No Authorization for "Indefinite Detention"
The plurality's last use of international law was the most explicit,
and it worked to limit the scope of the AUMF. Directly relying on four
treaties and one law review article, the plurality concluded that the
AUMF did not authorize "indefinite detention for the purpose of in-
terrogation."11 4 Here, in contrast to the earlier references to interna-
tional sources, the plurality limited its sources to treaties to'which the
United States is a party,1 15 and did so to avoid what might have been a
direct conflict between the scope of the AUMF and international law.
The difficulty with the plurality's analysis is that it ignored the
content of international law itself, as well its status in the domestic
legal system and the participation of the political branches in develop-
ing or approving such law. For example, the plurality failed to note
that the United States is a party to all four of the treaties upon which
it relied.116 It also failed to consider whether those treaties are self-
note 97, at 421-22 n.302. Although modern international law provides some protections to
people detained by their own governments, see supra note 107, this does not show that such
detentions are a "fundamental incident" of war. The detention of Confederate citizens
pursuant to the Lieber Code during the Civil War does not change this conclusion; Con-
gress had already suspended the writ of habeas corpus. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2672 n.5
(ScaliaJ., dissenting). In any event, because the Confederate states were the enemy in that
conflict, detention of their citizens merely suggests that detention itself was an integral
part of that war; it does not suggest that the detention of U.S. citizens is fundamental in
armed conflicts against foreign entities.
113 Justice Scalia criticized the majority's conclusion on this point, concluding that
Congress did not authorize the detentions of a citizen with the AUMF, citing in part "the
statutory prescription that '[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."' Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671 (Scalia.J.,
dissenting) (qtoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000)). He pointed out that some of the plural-
ity's authorities are irrelevant because they do not "address the detention of American citi-
zens." Id. at 2671 n.5 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 2641 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion).
11 The plurality relied on the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the 1929 Geneva
Convention, and the 1907 Hague Convention. See id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). It
also relied on the 1899 Hague Convention, which was superseded by the 1907 Hague Con-
vention for those states party to both. See DocUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 67-68 (Adam
Roberts & Richard Gtelffeds., 3d ed. 2000).
116 See supra note 101.
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executing and have direct effect as domestic law without any imple-
menting legislation, 17 and it did not discuss whether either of these
features was relevant in using the treaties to interpret the AUMF. Fur-
thermore, the treaties cited generally govern the treatment of prison-
ers of war,1" 8 but the plurality nowhere concluded that Hamdi is a
prisoner of war. Perhaps the plurality meant to suggest that the differ-
ence between prisoners of war and others does not matter for pur-
poses of detention, but this is problematic because the four conven-
tions are devoted largely to establishing who qualifies as a prisoner of
war and setting forth special rules governing their treatment. The
plurality did not, in other words, cite to any authority that prohibits
indefinite detention of non-prisoners of war.119 There are, in fact, in-
ternational norms that may bar such detention, 20 but they are not
among the sources that the plurality cited. 121
B. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion: More Expansive
Congressional Authorization
Justice Thomas joined the plurality in concluding that the AUMF
authorized Hamdi's detention, but he did not use international law to
117 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 (3) (1987).
118 See supra note 96. Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention may provide some pro-
tections for unlawful combatants, seejinks, supra note 97, at 403-09, but the President de-
nies that Article 3 applies to Hamdi's detention. See supra note 100.
119 One might argue that Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention prevents indefinite
detention of certain non-prisoners of war because it prohibits "cruel treatment" and the
"passing of sentences" without "previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
cotrt." Third Geneva Convention, supra note 96, art. 3(l) (a), (d), 6 U.S.T. at 3320. Even if
this argument is plausible, it was not advanced by the plurality, and Article 3 does not,
according to the Bush administration, apply to Hamdi's detention.
120 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights in Support of Petitioners at *8-9,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 354184 (arguing that
various treaties and customary international law prohibit "arbitrary detention").
121 The plurality reasoned that the AUMF authorized detention for the duration of
hostilities, based on "longstanding law-of-war principles," but also concluded that "[i] f the
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that
informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel." Hamdi, 124
S. Ct. at 2641 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). This suggests that if the type of conflict
involved is unlike the one that generated the law of war, the plurality might not view the
law of war as supporting the government's interpretation of the AUME One difficulty with
this point is that it would seem to apply to other parts of the plurality's opinion-why, for
example, do limitations on the treatment of prisoners of war apply even to those who may
not qualify as prisoners of war? Moreover, the standard of deviation that the plurality sug-
gests-practical circumstances" that are "entirely unlike" those contemplated by the law
of war-is a very difficult one to apply.
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reach that conclusion. Instead, Justice Thomas emphasized that Con-
gress and the President, not the courts, have primary control over na-
tional security issues, and that broad authorizations of authority to the
President by Congress do not imply a denial of specific powers not
explicitly enumerated by Congress. 122 He also suggested the problem,
discussed above, that the plurality's reasoning that the AUMF does
not authorize unlimited detentions was based only on treaties that
apply to prisoners of war.123 Justice Thomas left open the possibility
that international law could be used to expand, but not limit, the
scope of congressional authorization for the President's actions. 124
C. Opinions ofJuslices Scalia and Souter: No Congressional Authorization
Four Justices concluded that the AUMF did not provide congres-
sional authorization for the detention of Hamdi. Although all four
concluded that international law did not support the plurality's inter-
pretation of the AUMF, none took a clear position on the use of in-
ternational law to construe authorizations for the use of force in fu-
ture cases. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, reasoned in part
that Hamdi's detention may violate Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention, which requires a "competent tribunal" to determine
combatant status. 125 On this basis, Justice Souter rejected the plural-
ity's conclusion that the law of war authorized Hamdi's detention and
that the AUMF should be interpreted accordingly. 12 6
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, also concluded that the
AUMF did not authorize the detentions, although Justice Scalia rea-
122 Id. at 2675-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also relied on Moyer v. Pea-
body, which interpreted an 1897 act of tile Colorado legislature. See id. at 2679 (Thomas,J.,
dissenting) (citing Moyer x: Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909)).
123 Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that we may diminish the
Federal Government's war powers by reference to a treaty and certainly not to a treat), that
does not apply."). The "treaty that does not apply" seems to be the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, which Justice Thomas apparently concluded does not apply based on the govern-
ment's argument that the President conclusively determined that Hanmdi is not a prisoner
of war. See id. at 2679, 2685 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124 Elsewhere in his opinion Justice Thomas suggested that consistency with the law of
war may strengthen the President's assertion of authority, at least "to the extent that the laws
of war show that tihe power to detain is part of a sovereign's war powers." Id. at 2685 (Tho-
mas, J., dissenting). This is a potentially powerful and important argument, but it is not
related to the use of international law to construe the scope of congressional authorization.
125 Id. at 2658 (SouterJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment) (citing Third Geneva Convention, supra note 96, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3324).
126 The plurality opinion did not explicitly respond to Justice Souter's conclusions re-
garding Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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soned that congressional authorization short of suspending the writ of
habeas corpus would not make the detentions constitutional in any
event.127justice Scalia rejected the majority's reliance on international
law in part because the sources cited by the plurality did not address
the detention of U.S. citizens.128 justice Scalia, like Justice Souter, re-
jected the plurality's use of international law to interpret the AUMF as
authorizing Hamdi's detention, but he took no clear position on the
broader question of whether international law might serve to con-
strue general use of force resolutions in other cases. 129
D. Conclusion
The plurality's opinion has the following three analytical weak-
nesses: a failure to distinguish among different types of international
law, a lack of attention to the content of international law, and a fail-
ure to distinguish among different interpretive uses of international
law. First, the plurality did not distinguish among different types of
international law, although the different sources seem to vary widely
in their relationship to the AUMF. For example, treaties, the terms of
which have already been considered and approved by the President
and the Senate and which actually apply to the detention, would pro-
vide a particularly strong basis for determining the scope of authori-
zation by Congress.130 The Hamdi plurality, however, invoked treaties
without deciding whether or not they applied, seemed to employ out-
dated treatises on equal footing, and failed to clarify whether the Ge-
neva and Hague Conventions are self-executing.
The plurality also failed to focus on the content of international
law. For example, it cited the Hague and Geneva Conventions for the
"clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last
no longer than active hostilities."131 These sources, however, establish
127 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671-72 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
128 Id. at 2671-72 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The opinion distinguishes Terito and
Quirin on the grounds that those cases involved citizens who (unlike Hamdi) were "con-
ceded to have been members of enemy forces." Id. at 2670 nn.3-4 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
12 Confusing matters somewhat is Justice Scalia's observation that although "captivity
may be consistent with the principles of international law" this "does not prove that it also
complies with the restrictions that the Constitution places on the American Government's
treatment of its own citizens." Id. at 2671-72 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because this lan-
guage appears in a discussion of whether Congress authorized the detentions, it is unclear
whether it suggests that international law is inapplicable in that context, or whether it is
inapplicable as a tool of direct constitutional interpretation.
130 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
131 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion).
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this principle for prisoners of war, and the plurality did not conclude
that Hamdi qualified as such. 13 2 Moreover, if Hamdi is entitled to
prisoner-of-war status, the United States is in violation of its treaty ob-
ligations, but the plurality appeared to ignore this possibility entirely,
reasoning instead that its conclusion was "based on longstanding law-
of-war principles.' 3 3 This disregard for whether the United States is in
violation of its treaty obligations suggests not respect, but instead a
disdain for the binding nature of international law.' 34
The plurality also did not distinguish among the different inter-
pretive roles that international law can play in construing congres-
132 Id. (O'ConnorJ., plurality opinion). Moreover, the plurality opinion not only used
international law to interpret the scope of the AUMF, it also used international law (and
cases applying international law) to the virtual exclusion of any other interpretive tool, such
as close analysis of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000) or a discussion of
the Patriot Act.Justice Souter relied on both in reaching the opposite conclusion from the
majority. Id. at 2652-60 (SouterJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment).Justice Scalia, too, reached the opposite conclusion based in part on the
text of § 4001 (a), the canon of statutory interpretation that seeks to avoid "grave constitu-
tional concerns," and World War 11 era cases in which the Supreme Court refused to find
statutory authorization for the President's actions. Id. at 2669-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Perhaps international law serves as a better interpretive tool, but the plurality opinion does
not explain why.
'
5 5 fHamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (O'Connor,J., plurality opinion).
134 Of course, the plurality "fixed" these potential violations of international law by or-
dering a hearing (avoiding Article 5 violations) and prohibiting indefinite detention. Id. at
2673 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing "what might be called" the plurality's "Mr. Fix-it
Mentality" and "its mission to Make Everything Come Out Right"). The plurality did so,
however, without noting that the detentions might violate international law; this, in turn,
suggests that Congress enacted tie AUMF with a view toward "fundamental incidents of
war" as reflected in a handful of cases half a century old, biut with little regard to the cur-
rent obligations of tle United States under international law. The disregard for the con-
tent of international law, particularly the failure to focus on potential violations of interna-
tionial law, could eventually serve to fuel criticism that the United States only complies with
international law when it is convenient to do so. See Ainann, supra note 44, at 285 (noting
that U.S. demands for Iraqi compliance with the Third Geneva Convention had a "discon-
certingly hollow ring" in light of the treatment of Hamdi, Padilla, and the Guantanamo
detainees); id. at 285 n.95 ("'The Secretary of Defense would be in a better position to
defend the Geneva Conventions if he were applying them himself.'" (quoting Pas
d'interview, LE MONDE, Mar. 26, 2003)); Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm
Entrepreneurs in the U.S. "War on Terrorism," 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 72 (2004)
("Tihe across-the-board determination that the detainees were ineligible for POW status
came under intense criticism by human rights organizations, European governments, tie
International Committee of the Red Cross, and multilateral institutions." (footnotes omit-
ted)); Editorial, The Guantanamo Story, WASH. PosT, Jan. 25, 2002, at A24 (arguing that the
Guantanaimo detentions suggested that the "Bush administration would respect interna-
tional law only so far as it chose to"); Editorial, Stick to the Prison Rules: The Geneva Conven-
tion Protects Us All, GUARDIANJan. 18, 2002, at 19 (arguing that the "U.S. administration is
more at home with an improvised process that sometimes skirts the frontiers of legality
than with international agreements that impose firm reciprocal responsibilities").
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sional authorization for the President's actions. 13 5 Some actions of the
President may be prohibited by international law, others may be
affirmatively sanctioned by international law, and still others fall
largely outside of international law. Thus, by asking generally what
constitutes a "fundamental incident" of war, the Court obscured the
fact that Hamdi falls outside many of the legal regimes put in place by
the very international legal sources upon which the opinion depends.
All told, the plurality's direct and indirect recourse to interna-
tional law is flawed. Although the detention even of U.S. citizens as
enemy combatants may be a fundamental incident of armed conflict,
the plurality's analysis falls short of demonstrating this conclusion. The
plurality opinion potentially permits a broad and open-ended use of
many international legal sources (binding on the United States or
not), without sufficient attention to the actual content of international
law or the participation of the political branches in its development,
and with little effort to link meaningfully its analysis to the text of the
AUMF or any other measure of congressional intent. As a result, the
plurality opinion is open to the argument that its use of international
sources leaves too much discretion to judges; that it fails to provide
meaningful guidance for Congress, the President, or the lower courts;
and that it does not advance the development of transnational norms
or enhance the international position of the United States.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This Part explores in detail one potential use of international law
suggested by the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld opinion, and addresses some of
the problems identified above. 136 The plurality opinion in Hamdi con-
cluded that Congress had not authorized "indefinite detention for the
purpose of interrogation" in the AUMF because the Third Geneva
135 SeeJOHN K. SETEAR, A FOREST WITH No TREES: THE SUPREME COURT AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THE 2003-04 TERM 33 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12, 2004) (describing this part of the plurality's
opinion as having "a definite air of attention to customary international law"), available at
http://aw.bepress.com/uvalwps/tiva publiclaw/artl2 (Oct. 4, 2004).
136 This analysis does not foreclose other potential uses of international law in constru-
ing the AUMF, if such uses also avoid the pitfalls discussed above. In particular, this Part
does not consider whether the AUMF should be interpreted in a way consistent with inter-
national law, as opposed to an interpretation that disfavors violations of international law.
For example, one might ask whether the AUMF authorizes the President to detain prison-
ers of war. Although such detention is fully consistent with the Third Geneva Convention
(assuming that its conditions are met), international law does not require such detention.
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 46 B.C. L. Rev. 323 2004-2005
Boston College Law Review
Convention, the 1929 Geneva Convention, and the Hague Conven-
tions require the release of prisoners after the "conclusion of peace"
or end of "active hostilities.' '13 7 The plurality did not conclude, how-
ever, that these conventions actually applied to Hamdi's detention.
Justice Thomas, however, suggested that international law should not
be used to limit the scope of authorization for the use of force by
Congress. 138 There are strong reasons to conclude that general
authorizations for the use of force should not be interpreted to em-
power the President to violate international law. Therefore, if Hamdi's
detention conflicts with those laws, the courts should presume that
the AUMF does not grant such authority to the President. The point
is not that the plurality reached the wrong conclusion, but that by fo-
cusing more specifically on whether the international norms actually
applied to this detention, the plurality would have better linked its
conclusion to the presumed intentions of Congress and better pro-
moted separation-of-powers values.
The first Section of this Part considers the use of international
law based on the text of the AUMF, concluding that the text may sup-
port a general recourse to international law as an interpretive tool
and that there are some cases that may support this use of interna-
tional law.139 Neither the text of the authorization nor the cases, how-
ever, provide any clear basis upon which to distinguish among various
uses and sources of international law. 40 The following Section con-
siders the interpretive value of international law through the well-
established canon of statutory construction that seeks to avoid viola-
tions of international law.' 4 ' The final Section revisits the plurality's
opinion in Hamdi, considering how this canon of statutory construc-
37 lamdi %. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
138 See id. at 2679 (ThomasJ., dissenting). In one respect, the approach advanced here
is similar to that used byjustice Souer, who examined the Third Geneva Convention in far
greater detail than did the plurality and concluded that the government had failed to
demonstrate that Hamdi's detention comported with its requirements because it had not
aftorded him an Article 5 hearing.justice Souter, however, used this reasoning to conclude
that the government could not rely on international law to support its position. Under the
analysis here, however, if' Hamdi's detention conflicts with international law this does not
just prevent the government from relying on international law to support an expansive
view of the President's power in this case; it also means that the courts should presume
that the AUMF does not authorize such detentions. The analysis presented here is, moreo-
ver, somewhat different from that advanced by justice Souter, and this Article leaves open
the more general question of whether consistency with international law is an appropriate
tool for interpreting the AUMF See supra note 136.
139 See infra notes 143-163 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 143-163 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 164-245 and accompanying text.
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tion could apply based on claims that Hamdi's detention violated the
Third Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (the "ICCPR").142
A. The A UME: Text and Legislative History
The plurality appears to have used international law in part be-
cause the text of the AUMF, coupled with the historical practice of the
United States, invites the use of international law as an interpretative
tool. Or, to use language that the plurality did not, one might argue
that international law can help determine the plain meaning of the
text of the AUMF as understood by an ordinary speaker of English, 143
or to provide context that illuminates the terms used in the AUMF.144
The phrase "all necessary and appropriate force" as used in the
AUMF might invite recourse to international law for several reasons,
at least if it is equated with an authorization to conduct war or "armed
conflict" between states.145 The development of laws and customs of
war regulating the conduct of belligerents has been a focus of inter-
national law for centuries. 46 As a result, there is a well-developed and
sophisticated network of treaties, customary international law, and
treatises setting forth the rules and regulations governing the conduct
of war.147 The United States has been an active, and at times leading,
participant in the development of jus in bello.' 48
Moreover, considered in context, the AUMF clearly contem-
plated the use of force againstforeign states, groups, and individuals, 49
142 See infta notes 246-275 and accompanying text.
143 SeeANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997).
144 See Frank 11. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL' 61, 64 (1994).
145 This is the language used by the Geneva Conventions, which apply the law of war to
armed conflicts between states, even absent formal declarations of wa. First Geneva Con-
vention, art. 3, supra note 99, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18; Second Geneva Convention, art. 3, supra
note 99, 6 U.S.T. at 3220-22; Third Geneva Convention, art. 3, supra note 96, 6 U.S.T. at
3318-20; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 3, supra note 99, 6 U.S.T. at 3518-20. The term
"war" is no longer as significant under international law as it once was. See GREEN, supra
note 99, at 43-44; Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms
in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. j. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2004).
146 See GREEN, supra note 99, at 20-52.
147 See supra note 99 (naming some of the most important modern treaties on interna-
tional humanitarian law); see also GREEN, supra note 99, at 20-52 (same); Greenwood, supra
note 112, at 1-38 (describing the history and contemporary scope of international hu-
manitarian law).
148 See infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
149 Section 2(b) (1) of the AUMF also provides that it is "specific statutory authoriza-
tion" within the meaning of the War Powers Resolution, and section 2(a) and that the use
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perhaps inviting the use of international sources in a way that a purely
domestic act of Congress would not. Thus, even though the relevant
language of the AUMF is not a defined term under international law,
these sources might nonetheless serve as a guide to the commonly
understood meaning of "necessary and appropriate force," and pro-
vide useful interpretive context.
There is arguably some limited support for this approach in Su-
preme Court cases involving the scope of the President's powers when
Congress has authorized the use of force through a declaration of war.
In Brown v. United States, for example, the Court considered the Ex-
ecutive Branch's authority to seize enemy property in the United
States during a declared war.150 Reasoning that under the law of na-
tions the state of war itself did not vest enemy property in the foreign
sovereign, ChiefJustice Marshall concluded that a general declaration
of war was not sufficient; Congress had to specifically authorize the
seizure of property. 151
In more recent cases, the Court has generally depended on
specific, statutory authorization for the President's actions; where the
Court found such authorization lacking, it held the President's ac-
tions unlawful. 52 In these cases, the Court did not turn to the general
of force is authorized to "prevent any future acts of international terrorism." Authorization
for Use of Military Force, §§ 2(a)-(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)
(emphasis added); see David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal
and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 71, 75 (2002) (noting that the language of the AUMF does not include the word
"abroad" in reference to the use of force, but arguing that such language was probably
unnecessary because of the reference to the War Powers Resolution).
150 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 123 (1814).
151 Id. at 129; see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 710 (1900) (explaining that the
issue in Brown was whether the British property "could lawfully be condemned as enemy's
property ... without a positive act of Congress" and that the Chief Justice "relied on the
modern usages of nations" in "showing that the declaration of war did not, of itself, vest
the Executive with authority to order such property to be confiscated"); see also David
Golove, Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian
Approach, 35 N.Y.U.J. INr'i, L. & POL. 363. 383-84 (2003) (discussing the Brown case and
the limitations imposed by the law of war on the President's authority).
152 See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (granting habeas relief
to petitioners whose military trials exceeded the scope of congressional authorization un-
der the Hawaii Organic Act); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302-04 (1944) (granting habeas
relief to petitioner whose detention was authorized neither by federal statute nor by execu-
tive order). A possible exception is Madsen v. Kinsella, in which the Supreme Court ap-
peared to suggest in places that the statute in question did not authorize the military trial
of a dependent wife of a U.S. soldier, but elsewhere suggested that the statute was satisfied.
343 U.S. 341, 354-55 (1952) (stating that "[t]he 'law of war' in that connection includes at
least that part of the law of nations which defines the powers and duties of belligerent
powers occupying enemy territory pending the establishment of civil government," sug-
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authorization for the use of force (such as a declaration of war) cou-
pled with international law to uphold the President's actions. Simi-
larly, in Ex parte Quirin, the Court's reliance on the Articles of War as
providing specific authorization for the military commissions was
problematic because the President had failed to comply with certain
requirements imposed by the statute.1 53 Finding congressional
authorization by virtue of the declaration of war would have solved
this problem, and the Court could have relied on consistency with
international law to reach this conclusion, but it did not do so.154 The
World War II era cases used international law largely to interpret stat-
utes that specifically referenced it,155 or (less clearly) to set the scope
of the President's constitutional power, 56 rather than to interpret the
scope of a general authorization for the use of force.
gesting that the statute was satisfied). In suggesting that the President's authority did not
come from the statute, the Court stated the following:
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it ap-
pears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and
procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such
commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces of the United States.
Id. at 348. Where the Court has found congressional authorization, by contract, it has gen-
erally upheld the contested action. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-
05 (1943) (upholding detention authorized by both Congress and the President).
153 The Articles of War required submission of the commission's decision to the Judge
Advocate General's Office for review, but President Franklin Roosevelt's order made him-
self the sole reviewing authority. See G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurters "Soliloquy" in Ex
Parte Quirin, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 429-31 (2002).
154 The problem with this, asJustice Hugo Black reasoned, was that if the President was
not bound by the Articles of War, he might have the power "'to subject every person in the
United States to trial by military tribunals for every violation of every rule of war which has
been or may hereafter be adopted between nations among themselves."' Id. at 431 (quot-
ing Letter from Justice Hugo Black to Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone (Oct. 2, 1942)
(Hugo L. Black Papers, Library of Congress) (further citation omitted)); see Ingrid Brunk
Wuerth, The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants ". Modern Lessons from Mr Madison's
War, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1567, 1575 n.60 (2004) (discussing Quirin's reliance on the Articles
of War rather than the declaration of war).
155 Several cases, for example, interpreted the language of Article 15 of the Articles of
War, which provided that the Articles "shall not be construed as depriving military com-
missions ... of concurrentjurisdiction ... in respect of offenders or offenses that by stat-
ute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions." 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2000); see, e.g., Madsen, 343 U.S. at 350-55; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1946); Ex
parteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1942).
156 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-73, 781 (1950) (holding that en-
emy aliens detained abroad after conviction by military tribunal lacked the constitutional
right to petition U.S. courts for writs of habeas corpus, relying in part on the international
and comparative sources that distinguish between citizens and aliens and between friendly
and enemy aliens).
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Comparing the AUMF to other congressional authorizations for
the President to use force does not substantially clarify the appropri-
ate role of international law in interpreting the AUMF. A history of
explicit reference to international law in such authorizations, for ex-
ample, might make significant the absence of such language in the
AUMF. There is no clear pattern, however, of explicit references to
international law in congressional authorizations for the use of
force.1 57 Moreover, although the AUMF is arguably a very broad
authorization for the use of force, it is not as broad as the Bush ad-
ministration sought, and its language and scope are generally consis-
tent with other such authorizations. 158
Notably, the subsequent resolution in 2002 concerning Iraq
authorized the President to use "the Armed Forces of the United
States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in order to de-
fend national security and enforce United Nations Security Council
resolutions. 59 The AUMF, conversely, uses the phrase "necessary and
appropriate force" without the "he determines" language. This com-
I7 .See, e.g., Declaration of War Against Germany, S.J. Res. 1, 65th Cong., Pub. Res. No. 1,
ch. 1,40 Stat. 1 (1917). The 1917 Declaration of WarAgainst Germany stated the following:
[T]he President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the
entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the
Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and
to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the
country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
Id.; see Declaration of War Against Japan, S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong., Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55
Stat. 795 (1941) (resembling the 1917 Declaration ofWarAgainst Germany); seealsoGulfof
Tonkin Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964)
(providing Congress's support for "the determination of the President to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression"). Congress included a reference to international law when, in 1991, it
authorized the President to use force against Iraq to "achieve implementation of [United
Nations] Security Council Resolutions." Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 3, 3 (1991). The Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 includes similar language. Pub. L. No. 107-
243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002); see infra note 159.
158 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 39-41.
159 § 3(a), 116 Stat. at 1501 (emphasis added). The full text of section 3(a) of the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 reads as follows:
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as
he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to-(1) defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions regarding Iraq.
[Vol. 46:293
HeinOnline  -- 46 B.C. L. Rev. 328 2004-2005
Use of Force, International Law & Charming Betsy Canon
parison suggests that the 2002 Iraq authorization gives greater author-
ity to the President to determine what is "necessary and appropriate,"
arguably leaving a greater role for the courts to use a variety of
sources to determine what constitutes "necessary and appropriate"
under the 2001 AUMF. 160 Although these differences in language may
suggest differences in how much weight to accord the President's own
interpretation of the scope of authorizations for the use of force, they
do not clarify how the courts should use international law to interpret
such authorizations.
The legislative history of the AUMF also provides little guidance
as to how it should be interpreted specifically with respect to interna-
tional law. A few remarks from members of Congress suggest that the
AUMF was not intended to authorize violations of international law,161
and there are no floor statements to the contrary. These are poor
sources for statutory interpretation, however, and the AUMF was
passed without any conference reports, which might have provided
better tools of interpretation. 162 Furthermore, one staff member in-
volved in drafting the AUMF commented that although the language
was designed to comply with international law forbidding retaliation,
international law was otherwise a secondary consideration for those
who wrote the AUMF. 163
Neither the text, nor the cases, nor the legislative history de-
scribed above fully explain how international law should be used to
interpret the scope of the AUMF. The following section explores and
defends one such use of international law: general authorizations for
the use of force, such as the AUMF, do not authorize violations of in-
ternational law by the President.
160 The AUMF does use the phrase "he determines," but not in reference to what force
is "necessary and appropriate." See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). Instead, it uses that phrase in reference to de-
termining the appropriate target of the force-"those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001." Id.
161 147 CONG. REc. H5638, H5644 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001 ) (statement of Rep. Rou-
kema) (emphasizing that force should be used not just for retaliation, but also to defend
the rule of international law); id. at H5653 (statement of Rep. Barr) (arguing that Con-
gress should declare war to give "the President the tools, the absolute flexibility he needs
under international law and The Hague Convention to ferret these people out"); id. at
H5673 (statement of Rep. Clayton) (noting that Congress would monitor the President's
use of force to make sure it is "in accordance with international laws"); id. at 15675
(statement of Representative Jackson) (stating that "we must ... affirm the principles that
came tinder attack on September 11 -respect for innocent life and international law").
162 SeeAbramowitz, supra note 149, at 71.
163 Id. at 75 n.16.
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B. Through the Charming Betsy Lens
The Charming Betsy canon provides that when "fairly possible,"
courts will construe statutes or acts of Congress so as not to conflict
with "international law or with an international agreement of the
United States."' 64 The canon derives its name from ChiefJustice Mar-
shall's 1804 opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court in Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy. 165 That case considered whether the schoo-
ner's owner had violated the Nonintercourse Act of 1800, which pro-
hibited trade with France. 166 The Act applied to "any person or per-
sons resident within the United States, or under their protection.' ' 67
The Charming Betsy's owner argued in part that because he was a Dan-
ish citizen, applying the Act to him would violate principles of neutral-
ity under international law.168 The Court reasoned that "an act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if
any other possible construction remains" and concluded that the Act
did not apply to the owner because he was not under the diplomatic
protection of the United States. 169
1. Applying the Charming Betsy Canon
The plurality opinion in Hamdi did not identify the Charming
Betsy canon, nor did it express particular concern about violations of
international law; instead, the opinion discussed the limitation it im-
posed based on international law-no indefinite detentions-as sim-
ply based on "long-standing law-of-war principles.' ' 70 The canon, de-
spite the difficulties discussed below, nevertheless provides some good
initial reasons to construe a general authorization for the use of force
to avoid a conflict with international law.
First, the canon itself is a long-standing, well-established interpre-
tative device that courts employ in many different contexts.' 7' Courts
164 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 114 (1987).
165 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
166 Id. at 107. This principle of interpretation is even older than the case from which it
takes its name. See Bradley, supra note 21, at 485-86.
167 Federal Nonintercourse Act, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800).
168 Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 107.
169 Id. at 118. The language in the Charming Betsy case ("if any other construction re-
mains") is thus stronger than the language of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States ("where fairly possible").
170 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (O'Conno;J., plurality opinion).
171 See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004)
(antitrust); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (anti-discrimination); McCulloch v.
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have cited customary international law, as well as treaties, as the basis
for applying the Charming Betsy canon. 172 If courts generally construe
acts of Congress to avoid conflict with international law, they should
accordingly refuse to interpret the term "all necessary and appropri-
ate force" as embracing the violation of international law by the
President.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963) (National Labor
Relations Act); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (Jones Act); Allegheny Lud-
lum Corp. v. United States, 367 F.3d 1339, 1345, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Tariff Act of
1930); Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 356 F.3d 641, 646-47 (5th Ciin) (Americans
with Disabilities Act), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 26 (2004); Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1095, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001) (Immigration and Nationality Act); Cheung v. United States,
213 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (federal extradition statute); United States v. Robinson, 843
F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (smuggling statutes); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
695 E Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987). The case is also
cited for the proposition that courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional ques-
tions. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988).
172 See Hoffmann-La Roche, 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (invoking the canon based on interna-
tional comity); Rossi, 456 U.S. at 32 (applying canon based on a sole executive agreement);
McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-22 (applying canon to avoid the "'delicate field of international
relations'" (citation omitted) without specifying specific sources of international law);
Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884) (applying cannon based on a
treaty); Kim Ho Ma, 257 F.3d at 1114 (applying canon based both on customary interna-
tional law and on the ICCPR, a non-self-executing treaty); see also Bradley, supra note 21, at
483 (observing that the Charming Betsy canon presumably applies to all international obli-
gations of the United States); cf Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1179-82 (arguing that the
canon should apply based both on various kinds of international law and on norms that
have not achieved the status of law). The Supreme Court recently considered the ICCPR
and noted that it "did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts." Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004). Elsewhere, the opinion remarked that
"the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and
applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the
document were not self-executing." Id. at 2763 (citing 138 CONG. REC. H8071 (1992)).
This language might be read broadly to suggest that non-self-executing treaties (at least
those in the area of international human rights law) should not provide the basis for the
Charming Betsy canon because employing the canon involves, at least in a broad sense, "in-
terpreting and applying" such law. But the question in Sosa v. Aharez-Machain was whether
the international norm supplied a private cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute,
and in the quoted passage the Court was explaining its general hesitation to conclude that
it did. Id. at 2762-64. In Hamdi, by contrast, the federal habeas statute provides the right of
action, and the international norm is not employed as a rule of decision, but instead as a
method of construing the scope of congressional authorization for the use of force. Justice
Breyer, who joined this section in Sosa, went on to reason that the Charming Betsy canon
might apply in this case, based on "notions of comity," without recognizing any tension
between the canon and the majority's opinion. See id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and concurring in thejudgment).
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Second, the canon is bolstered by another related, interpretive
canon. Courts typically assume that Congress does not intend to re-
peal domestic law by implication; 173 they should accordingly hesitate
to construe Congress as authorizing the President to violate U.S. law
absent more specific language than that found in the AUMF. 174 This
interpretative canon would apply to self-executing treaties, which
qualify as domestic law under the Supremacy Clause. 175
Third, the canon provides some concrete limits on what sorts of
international legal materials are relevant-subject to some limitations
discussed below, only international agreements binding on the United
States and international norms so well-entrenched that nations are
legally obligated to follow them as customary international law would
serve as interpretive sources. 76 Although this does not solve problems
associated with defining the scope of customary international law it-
self, it at least limits the courts largely to these norms. Moreover, in-
ternational humanitarian law offers a particularly well-defined body of
treaty and custom-based norms,177 much of which is incorporated into
U.S. and foreign practice. 78 This has the dual advantage of providing
a clearer background norm against which Congress can authorize the
173 See, e.g., United States v. United Cont'l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976).
174 See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. Ri:v. 97, 130-31 (2004) (noting that many violations of the Geneva Conven-
tions are crimes under U.S. law and concluding that it is "difficult to sustain a claim that
Congress impliedly repealed various provisions of the U.S. penal code and the Uniform
Code of MilitaryJustice with a single, sweeping resolution").
175 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIlIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3) cmt. c (1987).
176 When applying the canon based on "international comity," the Supreme Court has
sometimes used sources that do riot clearly qualify as binding under customary interna-
tional law. See Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1146-52. As discussed below, there is a strong
argument that courts should apply the canon to avoid potential violations of international
law, which leaves somewhat more discretion in the hands of the courts, but also enjoys
many advantages. See injra notes 246-256 and accompanying text.
177 SeeJinks, supra note 97, at 374-75 n.30 (arguing that international humanitarian
law is more detailed, better incorporated into domestic law, and has a better-enforcement
regime than international human rights law); see also DerekJinks, September 11 and the Law
of War, 28 YALE J. INT'l L. 1, 2 (2003) (indicating that the laws of war offer a "widely-
accepted" and "fully articulated normative framework"); supra note 147 and accompanying
text (indicating that a body of treaties, customary international law, and treatises sets forth
the rules and regulations governing the conduct of war).
178 See Greenwood, supra note 112, at 33-37 (describing the incorporation of interna-
tional humanitarian law into German law and practice); Jinks, supra note 97, at 376-77,
n.44 (describing the incorporation of the Third Geneva Convention into national military
mantals of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom); infra 197-201 and ac-
companying text.
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use of force as well as providing some limits on the scope of relevant
norms that courts can employ.
One might argue that unlike a statute, the AUMF is an explicit
grant of authority to the Executive Branch, and thus the canon simply
does not apply. Under one variation of this argument, the AUMF
authorizes the President to do anything that he finds appropriate.
Eight of the nine Justices rejected this approach in Hamdi, however,
by limiting the scope of the AUMF contrary to the views of the Presi-
dent.179 Another variation of this argument is that the AUMF should
be interpreted as authorizing the President, not Congress, to make
decisions about particular violations of international law. The canon
itself suggests that this argument is incorrect for the reasons given
above, as do the factors discussed in the following discussion, includ-
ing a more specific analysis of the likely intent of Congress, the text of
the Constitution, and other separation-of-powers considerations. 80
2. Objections Based on Congressional Intent
The Charming Betsy canon is frequently justified based on the pre-
sumed intentions of Congress, yet some have questioned whether that
presumption is accurate,' 18 particularly in the context of international
human rights. 182 Professor Curtis Bradley, for example, has argued
R9 See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
is0 See infra notes 181-245 and accompanying text.
181 There are many debated grounds for discounting "congressional intent" when in-
terpreting congressional enactments. See generally SCAtIA, supra note 143; Easterbrook,
supra note 144. Yet every commentator to consider the Charming Betsy canon at length
concludes that, at least to some extent, it is properly based on the presumed intentions of
Congress. See Bradley, supra note 21, at 533; Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1185-86; Swaine,
supra note 58, at 717-18 n.365; see also RESTATFMENT (THIRD) OF THE. FOREIGN REIATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. a (1987) (stating that "[iut is generally assumed
that Congress does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the United
States"); cf. Turley, supra note 21, at 269 (arguing that the canon should be replaced by
case-by-case consideration of each statute to evaluate the likely intent of Congress among
other considerations). More importantly, the courts seem to employ the canon because
they believe that it maximizes the preferences of Congress. See, e.g., E Hoffman-La Roche,
124 S. Ct. at 2366 ('This rule of construction reflects principles of customary international
law-law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to Follow."); Rossi, 456 U.S. at
31-32 (reasoning that "if Congress intended [a particular outcome] it must have intended
to repudiate [certain] executive agreements," then applying the Charming Betsy canon to
counter this interpretation); Chew Heong, 112 U.S. at 540 (indicating that courts should not
doubt that treaty compliance and the "honor of the government and the people of the
United States" were "present in the minds of [members of Congress] when the legislation
in question was enacted").
182 Bradley, supra note 21, at 520-23. Among the potential reasons Io discount the
Charming Betsy canon is that America's strength as a superpower may make compliance
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that we have "fairly specific evidence" of the views of the political
branches with respect to customary international law in the human
rights area. 183 Citing the failure of the United States to ratify many
human rights treaties and the substantial reservations it has made to
others,184 Professor Bradley questions the empirical claim that the po-
litical branches actually wish to comply with customary international
law. Whatever force this argument might have in the human rights
context, however, it does not apply with respect to international hu-
manitarian law.
First, as a general matter, the United States has long been a
leader in the development of the law of war, including international
humanitarian law. 185 The Lieber Code, adopted as law by the Union
during the Civil War, were the "first modern codification of the law of
armed conflict, ''186 and they became the basis for many similar codes
of wartime conduct, as well as future treaties to which the United
with international law less trgent today than it was when the canon first developed. Id. at
492, 519. The continued vitality of the canon undercuts this argument as a general matter;
in any event, this reasoning has less force with respect to the rules of warfare where the
United States may fear immediate reprisals against its military personnel. The capture by
Iraq of U.S. troops and the U.S. insistence that they be treated according to the rules of
war provides one illustration. See Amamn, supra note 44, at 285. A final possible reason to
discount the canon, at least in the Hamdi case itself, is that international tension and dis-
cord are unlikely to result from the military's treatment of its own citizens as opposed to
foreign nationals. This consideration should not, however, defeat the application of the
canon. First, international law is increasingly concerned with how nations treat their own
citizens. Second, the canon, even as a function of congressional intent, is not designed
solely to avoid international discord. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 114, 115 cmt. a (explaining the Charming Betsy rule
as a function of congressional intent without suggesting any limitation based on fear of
retaliation or international diplomatic fallout). In any event, it seems unlikely that in
authorizing the use of force Congress intended that the treatment of U.S. citizens would
fall below the international standards for the treatment of foreign combatants, so there is
good reason to apply an intent-based version of the canon here, even apart from concerns
about international tensions.
183 Bradley, supra note 21, at 520.
184 Id. at 520-21 nn.242-45 (discussing the ICCPR in particular).
185 See President Ronald Reagan's Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, Put. PAPERS 91-92 (Jan. 29, 1987) (describing the United
States as "in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve the international rules of hu-
nanitarian law in armed conflict"); OI'PENHEIM, supra note 93, § 125, at 293 (stating that
"[t]he Treaty of Friendship concluded in 1785 between Prussia and the United States of
America was probably the first to stipulate ... proper treatment for prisoners of war"
(footnote omitted)); Major Scott R. Morris, The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for Warriors,
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1997, at 6-13 (describing the American commitments and contribution
to international humanitarian law fioni the Revolutionary War through World War I).
186. See GREEN, supra note 99, at 29 n.63.
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States is a party.1 87 Since 1916, the Articles of War have referred to "of-
fender or offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by
such military commissions,' ' 188 forcing the Supreme Court to interpret
the law of war in cases including Ex parte Quifin189 and In re Yama-
shita.'90 The United States is also a party to the major conventions
governing international humanitarian law,191 and played a leading
role in initiating and drafting many of them. 192 Although the United
States has refused to become a party to Protocols I and II to the Ge-
neva Conventions, 193 it has recognized that much of Protocol I and all
187 See id. at 29-30 (discussing the role of the Lieber Code in the Civil War and con-
cluding that "[t]he rules embodied in the Lieber Code were so consistent with accepted
practice that... between 1870 and 1893 similar manuals or codes were issued by Prussia,
1870; The Netherlands, 1871; France, 1877; Russia 1877 and 1904; Servia, 1878; Argentina,
1881; Great Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893").18 8 Articles of War of 1916, art. 15, 39 Stat. 650, 653 (1916).
189 317 U.S. at 27-36; see supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
190 327 U.S. at 13-15 (analyzing whether charges that the general failed to control his
troops and prevent brutal atrocities violated law of war, including norms derived from the
Hague Conventions); id. at 31-40 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (finding it "impossible to agree
that the charge ... stated a recognized violation of the laws of war").
191 See supra note 99.
192 The Lieber Code, for example, had "tremendous impact on the codification of in-
ternational humanitarian law," including the 1899 and 1907 regulations annexed to the
1907 Hague Convention, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Theodor Meron, Francis
Lieber's Code and Principles of Humanity, 36 COiWtM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269. 279-80 (1997).
The initiative for the 1907 Hague Conventions came from President Theodore Roosevelt.
DOcuMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 115, at 67.
193 In addition to the failure to ratify Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, see
supra note 99, one could also cite the failure of the United States to sign the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507. See generallyJodi Preusser
Mustoe, Note, The 1997 Treaty to Ban the Use of Landmines: Was President Clinton's Refusal to
Become a Signatory Warranted?, 27 GA.J. INT'L Comp. L. 541 (1999). But Presidents George
H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton took extensive actions to achieve compliance with the
treaty and its goals, including a legislative moratorium on landmine production (passed
during the George H.W. Bush administration but later repealed under the Clinton ad-
ministration) and the allocation of significant funds to remove landmines internationally.
See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous.
L. REV. 623, 657-62 (1998). Moreover, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
George W. Bush administration did not use landmines. The International Campaign to
Ban Landmines reported in September 2002 that in Afghanistan "there were reports of
limited use of mines and booby-traps by Taliban arid AI-Qaeda fighters, as well as the
Northern Alliance" but "there were no instances of use of antipersonnel mines by the
United States or coalition forces." INT'L CAMPAIGN 10 BAN LANDMINES, LANIMINE MONI-
TOR REPORT 2002: TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD 6 (2002), available at http://www.
icbl.org/lm/2002/print/report/intro.pdlf. The Physicians for Human Rights reported that
"it appears that US and allied troops did riot plant landmines during [the war in Iraq],"
although Iraqi forces did lay mines. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WAR IN IRAQ, BULLE-
TIN No. 6, REPORTS FROM THE FIELD: DETAILED MINEFIELD AND CLUSTER BOMB TARGET
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of Protocol II codify customary international law,194 and U.S. military
manuals on international law often track the language of Protocol
1. 195 There is little basis for any general claim that the political
branches do not wish to comply with international humanitarian law.
Second, the Executive Branch has consistently reiterated its com-
mitment to follow the law of war, both custom and treaty-based. From
the famous blockade ordered by President Abraham Lincoln at the
outset of the Civil War that generated The Prize Cases, to the seizure of
Cuban fishing vessels during the Spanish-American War, to the military
trials of World War II, to U.S. conduct in the Persian Gulf War, Presi-
dents have made explicit their desire to comport with the law of war. 196
This remains true today, with the Bush administration defending
its treatment of detainees around the world as consistent with interna-
SITE INFORMATION MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PROTECT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND
RECONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL (2003), http://www.phrnsa.org/research/iraq/buliletin_
050603.htnl (date released May 6, 2003). Thus, although hesitant to sign the Landmine
Convention because of military commitments in Korea, the United States has not under-
mined it, but has instead worked toward the goals that it espouses. The point here is not
that the United States complies with all international humanitarian norms; the point is
instead that the U.S. government generally seeks to comply with such norms and that
Congress is unlikely to intend that they be violated.
194 See L. Lynn Hogute, Identifying Customary International Law of War in Protocol I: A Pro-
posed Restatement, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 279, 282-87 (1990) (arguing against
ratification of Protocol I and noting that many of its provisions reflect customary interna-
tional law);Jinks, supra note 97, at 385 ILI 14 ("The U.S. has stated it considers many provi-
sions of Protocol 1, and all of Protocol 11, to be binding customary international law."
(quoting fiom JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCH., U.S. ARMY, Legal Framework of the Law of
War, in LAW OF WAR WORKSHIOP DFSKBOOK 25, 32 (Brian J. Bill ed., 2000))); Theodor
Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol 1, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
678, 681 (1994) (arguing that Protocol I should be ratified by the United States and noting
that some of its provisions reflect customary international law).
195 Robert Kogod Goldman, The Legal Regime Governing the Conduct of Operation Desert
Storm, 23 U. ToL. L. REV. 363, 364 (1992).
196 Quinn, 317 U.S. at 12; Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712 (quoting presidential declara-
tion of blockade in ptrsuance of law of nations); Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Block-
ade Against Southern Ports, Apr. 19, 1861 (announcing blockade in pursuance of the law of
nations); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 33 (1992) (describing U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions during the
Persian Gulf War); Colonel James P. Terry, Operation Desert Storm: Stark Contrasts in Compli-
ance with the Rule of Law, 41 NAVAL L. REv. 83, 84-95 (1993) (describing U.S. compliance
with international law (hiring the Persian Gulf War); see also Golove, supra note 151, at 378-
94 (detailing the "long and laudable tradition of the U.S. military in guiding its conduct
strictly in accordance with the requirements of international law," citing examples from the
Revolutionary War, armed conflict with France in 1790s, the War of 1812, the Mexican-
American War, the Civil Wal, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II).
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tional law.'9 7 Although this administration has advanced controversial
opinions about the scope of the Geneva Conventions,' 98 it has not de-
nounced or repudiated its intentions to comply with international
humanitarian law.' 99 With respect to Operation Iraqi Freedom, for
example, a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive explicitly requires the appli-
cation of law of war obligations "during all stages of operational plan-
ning and execution ofjoint and combined operations. '" 200 In addition,
the Department of Defense requires all branches of the armed forces
to comply with the law of war in conducting military operations and
related activities. 2° The consistent commitment by the Executive
197 See, e.g., Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Briefing on Detainee Operations, su/5ra
note 2 (stating that "our policies are treating the detainees entirely consistent with the
framework of the Geneva Convention"); Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Briefing on Ge-
neva Convention, EPW's and War Crimes (Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Transcript, U.S. Dep't
of Defense, Briefing on Geneva Convention], http://wv.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/
t04072003_t407genv.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2003). W. Hays Parks stated the following:
Let me talk a little bit about DOD policies and the conflict in Iraq. The
United States and coalition forces conduct all operations in compliance with
the law of war. No nation devotes more resources to training and compliance
with the laws of war than the United States. U.S. and coalition forces have
planned for the protection and proper treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war
under each of the Geneva conventions I have identified. These plans are in-
tegrated into current operations.
Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Briefing on Geneva Convention, supra.
198 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Yoo & RobertJ. Delahunty, Office of Legal Coun-
sel, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Defense
1-2 (Jan. 9, 2002) (discussing the application of treaties and laws to al Qaeda andl Taliban
detainees and concluding that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to detainees from the
war in Afghanistan).
199 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 2 ("[T]he law of war per-
mits the detention of enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict. It permits this
detention without the use of a review process. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has
decided as a matter of policy to institute this review process."); see also supra note 197.
200 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF SrAFF, INSTRUCTION 5810.011B, IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF THE DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM § 4(b) (Mar. 25, 2002). The law of war definition
includes "treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, as
well as applicable customary international law." Id. § 5(a).
201 Seegenerally U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM
(Dec. 9, 1998), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d510077_
120998/d510077p.pdf. The Executive Branch has also specifically committed itself to the
Geneva Conventions. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS
OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES § 1-5(a)(2)
(Oct. 1, 1997) ("All persons taken into custody by U.S. forces will be provided with the pro-
tections of the [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War] until
some other legal status is determined by competent authority."), available at http://
www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r]90-8.pdf, supra note 197; see also Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at
2658 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that Army Regulation 190-8 was adopted to implement the Geneva Conventions).
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Branch to comply with international law supports the view that Con-
gress would assume that the courts and the President would interpret
its authorization as extending only to those actions that do not violate
the law of war.
Third, treaties reflect limitations to which the Senate at least has
already given its formal advice and consent. The Senate itself and the
President, for example, have previously considered and approved the
limitations on the use of force that are codified in treaties such as the
Geneva Conventions. Moreover, in approving such treaties, the Senate
has considered the scope of appropriate force in the same context (in
one sense) as it arises in the following case: defining and limiting the
actions that the U.S. military is permitted to take. This is a separate
argument from the desire to avoid repeal of domestic law, which
would apply only to self-executing treaties. 202 Here, the point is that
the limitation on the use of force is one that the Senate has already
considered and approved, and this point applies to non-self-executing
as well self-executing treaties.
In summary, there are excellent reasons based on the presumed
intentions of Congress to apply the Charming Betsy canon in interpret-
ing general authorizations for the use of force by Congress. Potential
objections about the use of customary international law as an inter-
pretive norm are at least partially answered by the role that the
United States has played in the development of international humani-
tarian law, the clear commitment of the Executive Branch to comply
with that law, and the (at least relatively) well-defined content of this
branch of customary international law.
3. Objections Based on Separation of Powers
The promotion of separation of powers is sometimes advanced as
another basis for the Charming Betsy canon. 203 The roles of the three
branches differ somewhat, however, when courts consider a statute
and when they consider authorizations for the use of force, and these
differences could make the Charming Betsy canon inapplicable in the
latter situation. If courts construe an ambiguous civil statute to
conflict with international law, generally they risk putting the nation
in violation of international law without the clear intent of either of
202 See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
203 Bradley, supra note 21, at 524-33; Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1129-34.
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the political branches to do so. 204 Phrased differently, to the extent
the canon is based on separation-of-powers concerns, it may be de-
signed at least in part to prevent courts from construing statutes to
create a violation of international law unintended by either Congress
or the President.2 5 In considering the scope of Congress's authoriza-
tion for the use of force, however, the preferences of the President are
clear; it is the President's actions that are under judicial scrutiny. The
question is thus whether the canon is designed simply to disable the
courts in favor of action by either the Congress or the Executive
Branch, or whether it also reflects a preference for legislative (as op-
posed to presidential) action that violates international law.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explicitly recog-
nized this issue in United States v. Corey, a case involving the extraterri-
torial application of a federal criminal statute. 20 6 The defendant ar-
gued that application of the statute to his conduct abroad would
violate international law and that under the Charming Betsy canon the
court should refuse this interpretation.20 7 The panel rejected this ar-
gument on the grounds that concurrent jurisdiction did not violate
international law. 20 8 In dicta, however, Judge Alex Kozinski also rea-
soned that the concerns underlying the Charming Betsy canon "are ob-
viously much less serious where the interpretation arguably violating
international law is urged upon us by the Executive Branch of our
government" and that "we must presume that the President has evalu-
ated the foreign policy consequences of such an exercise of U.S. law
204 This is not generally true of criminal statutes, however, where the government
brings the action and thus has made the decision that the benefits of interpreting the stat-
ute in violation of the law of nations outweigh the risks; some have resisted application of
the canon in the criminal context for these reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Corey, 232
F.3d 1166, 1179 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000). It is not necessarily true of civil statutes either because
the government can and frequently does brief the court on the questions before it, ensur-
ing that the court reaches its decision fully informed of the government's views on tile
case. In Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, for example, tile government filed an amicus
brief in an antitrust suit brought by private purchasers ofvitamins against private manufac-
turers and distributors. See 124 S. Ct. at 2369.
205 Bradley, supra note 21, at 526 (stating that "by requiring Congress to decide ex-
pressly whether and how to violate international law, the canon reduces the number of
occasions in which Congress unintentionally interferes with the diplomatic prerogatives of
the President"); Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1132 (noting that the canon might be based
on concerns about the United States speaking with "one voice" in foreign affairs issues,
including the "prospect of embarrassing the executive branch").
206 Corey, 232 F.3d at 1177-79.
207 See id. at 1169.
208 Id. at 1179.
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and determined that it serves the interests of the United States."20 9
This suggests that the separation-of-powers values upon which the
canon is based make it inapplicable when the court is evaluating the
President's own actions.
The historical use of the canon, however, provides a somewhat
different picture. Judge Kozinski supported his reasoning with the
observation that the Supreme Court had never invoked the canon
against the governnent in a case to which it was a party.210 This is in-
correct-in 1913, the Supreme Court ruled against the United States
in MacLeod v. United States, a case involving the collection of duties in
occupied territory.211 The United States imposed the duties on the
Venus, a vessel bound for Cebu, an island held by local forces who col-
lected their own duties from the vessel. 212 The government claimed
that a subsequent act of Congress had ratified its actions. 213 The Court
disagreed, explaining that international law permitted the collection
of tariff duties only in places under the occupation and control of the
United States, which did not include Cebu.214 The Court thus con-
209 Id. at 1179 n.9.
210 Id. Judge Kozinski also characterized the Charming Betsy case itself as involving a "pri-
vate dispute," but this is not entirely accurate. On the one hand, the vessel was seized by a
captain in the U.S. Navy, pursuant to an act of Congress that made commerce with France
illegal, and in accordance with an order by the President directing naval officers to "do all
that in you lies, to prevent all intercourse, whether direct or circuitous, between the ports of
the United States and those of France and her dependencies." Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 78. Thus, the case stands on somewhat different footing than a purely private
dispute. On the other hand, the captain stood to gain financially from the capture, and the
government was not a party to the litigation. After losing in the lower court, the captain
sought assistance from the federal government, which apparently paid for the bond neces-
sary to appeal the case. See Frederick C. Leiner, The Charming Betsy and the Marshall Court,
45 A i. J. LE(;AL Hisr. 1, 9-10 (2001). Eventually, Congress ordered the captain compen-
sated from federal funds after he lost the case before the Supreme Court; one argument
advanced for his compensation from the Senate was that he acted as an agent of the federal
government and had no discretion to disobey the orders given to him. Id. at 18-19. One
commentator has noted that the 1805 bill signed by President Thomas Jefferson to com-
pensate the captain was "the first time that Congress ever indemnified a public officer for a
service-,elatedjudgment." Id. at 19.
211 229 U.S. 416, 435 (1913).
212 Id. at 418-19.
213 Id. at 423-24.
214 In support, the Supreme Court cited the Hague Convention of 1899, which pro-
vides in part that "[tlerritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only to the territory where such
authority is established, and in a position to assert itself."' Id. at 426 (quoting the Conven-
tion with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,July 29, 1899, art. 42, 32 Stat.
1803, 1 Bevans 247, 259). The Court also cited various sources to show that the insurgents
at Cebu had established a de facto government, includingJohn Bassett Moore's Digest of
International Law and prior practice of the U.S. Executive Branch. Id. at 428-30.
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cluded that the statute did not authorize the actions of the military
collector, reasoning-without citing the Charming Betsy case2' 5-that
"it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate the obli-
gations of this country to other nations."216
The Court has applied the same reasoning (again without citing
the Charming Betsy canon) against the government in cases involving
U.S. treaty obligations. In Chew Heong v. United States, the Court inter-
preted a federal statute to permit a former Chinese resident of the
United States to reenter the country.21 7 This interpretation was consis-
tent with U.S. treaty obligations, but contrary to the views of the Ex-
ecutive Branch. The Court emphasized that repeal of a treaty involves
"question[s] of good faith with the government or people of other
countries."218 Thus, Chew Heong and other cases like it suggest that at
215 The Court has since cited MacLeod for the Charming Betsy principle. Lauritzen, 345
U.S. at 578.
216 MacLeod, 229 U.S. at 434. The paragraph reads in full as Follows:
The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the Govern-
ment to act within the limitation of the principles of international law, the
observance of which is so essential to the peace and harmony of nations, and
it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate the obligations of
this country to other nations, which it was the manifest purpose of the Presi-
dent to scrupulously observe and which were founded upon the principles of
international law.
Id. Although the Supreme Court also based this interpretation on a proclamation by the
President, that proclamation did not explicitly reference the law of war; instead it used the
term "occupation," see id. at 420, which the Court construed in light of international law.
Id. at 425-26, 432. Thus, the Court used international law not only to construe a statute
contrary to the views of the United States, but also to construe a Presidential Proclamation
contrary to the views of the government.
217 112 U.S. 536, 560 (1884); see also Steinhardt, supra note 21, at 1154-56 (arguing
that the Supreme Court used the Charming Betsy canon (without citing it) to defeat the
government's interpretation of a statute in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
218 Id. at 549. The Supreme Court construed the statute so as to not abrogate the
treaty, contrary to the government's interpretation. It reasoned that
the court cannot be unmindful of the fact that the honor of the government
and people of the United States is involved in every inquiry whether rights
secured by such stipulations shall be recognized and protected. And it would
be wanting in proper respect for the intelligence and patriotism of a co-
ordinate department of the government were it to doubt, for a moment, that
these considerations were present in the minds of its members when the legis-
lation in question was enacted.
Id. at 540. Thus, the foreign policy implications of the issue were much on the mind of the
Court, but it still refused to defer to the Executive Branch.
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least with respect to treaties, courts have a preference for legislative
rather than executive decisions. 219
In a more recent case in which the government made its views
known through an amicus brief, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Califor-
nia,220 the majority of the Court construed the statute at issue in a
manner consistent with the government's position without citing the
Charming Betsy canon. The dissent, however, authored by Justice Scalia
and joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas relied on the
canon extensively to interpret the statute contrary to the views of the
United States, without suggesting any potential conflict.221 Lower
courts, too, have used the canon to defeat the government's interpreta-
tion of a statute. 222 Even when using the canon to interpret a statute in
harmony with the executive's views, courts do not simply discount the
canon in deference to the government's position.223 The actual use of
219 See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-22 (1933) (construing a re-
enacted TariffAct to avoid abrogating or modifying an earlier treaty, contrary to the inter-
pretation afforded the Act by the Executive Branch); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446,
447-49 (1924) (construing a subsequent Act of Congress in harmony with an earlier treaty
and contrary to the views of the Executive Branch). These cases, like Chew Heong, do not
cite the Charming Betsy canon. They apply the same reasoning, however, by construing stat-
utes to avoid conflict with international law in cases involving treaty obligations. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIlE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 re-
porters' note 1 (1987) (citing Chew Heong and Cook as applications of the Charming Betsy
canon); Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J.
INT'L LAW 313, 322-23 (2001) (citing Chew Heong as an application of the canon); Bradley,
supra note 21, at 488 n.48 (citing Cook and Chew Heongas applications of the canon).
220 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
221 Id. at 815-20 (Scalia,J., dissenting); see also Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an
Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 289, 325 n.124 (describing
the government's anhicus brief, which argued that application of the statute "would not
frustrate British policy," a conclusion that the dissent implicitly rejected).
222 See, e.g., Allegheny, 367 F.3d at 1348 (interpreting the Tariff Act of 1930 against the
Commerce Department in part based on a ruling of the World Trade Organization (the
"W 'O")); Kim Ho Ma, 257 F.3d at 1114-15 (interpreting the Immigration and Nationality
Act against the Immigration and Naturalization Service); FTC v. Compagne de Saint-
Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 13010, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (interpreting FTC Act
against tile FTC); Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1464-72 (reading the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1987 in conformity with the United Nations Headquarters Agreement
and denying an injunction sought by the government to close down the observer mission
of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the United Nations Headquarters); The Over
The Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842-44 (D. Conn. 1925) (dismissing a libel brought by the United
States in part because the government's interpretation of the statute might contravene a
treaty between tile United States and Great Britain); cf Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F2d 487, 493-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (interpreting the Commodity
Exchange Act against the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
223 See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, 124 S. Ct. at 2362, 2366-68. In Hoffman-La Roche, the
government's anlicus brief detailed the foreign policy problems associated with applying
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the canon thus suggests a preference for a legislative, rather than
purely executive, decision to violate international law. This is true both
because the courts refuse to automatically defer to the executive, even
when its views are clear and those of Congress are not, and because
courts occasionally use the canon to defeat the interpretation offered
by the government.
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's application
of a related canon, the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of statutes, directly counter to the government's position. 224 The
Court has applied the presumption against extraterritorial application
of U.S. law to defeat an agency's interpretation of a statute. 2 5 Indeed,
in one case the Court reasoned that "[fWor us to run interference in
such a delicate field of international relations there must be present
the statute broadly, including "tension with our trading partners," the risk of foreign re-
taliation in the form of "statutory counter-reactions," and the risk of undermining coop-
eration with foreign agencies. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at *21-22, F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (No.
03-724), 2004 WL 234125. For these reasons, the government's brief urged the Supreme
Court to apply the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes. See
id. The Court did so, quoting from the Charming Betsy case, but spent several pages analy-Z
ing international law and the potentially deleterious effects of the statute on the interests
of other nations, based in part on briefs filed by the governments of Germany, Japan, and
Canada; the amicus brief for the United States was cited in passing at the end of the dis-
cussion. Hoffman-La Roche, 124 S. Ct. at 2366-68. The Court never suggested that the gov-
ernment's views on the foreign policy implications of the case rendered the Charming Betsy
canon inapplicable. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, the Court
construed a statute in conformity with the views of the U.S. government (and against the
National Labor Relations Board), applying the Charming Betsy canon without showing any
particular deference to the government's amicus brief, although the Court did show con-
cern with interpreting the statute contrary to State Department regulations. McCulloch, 372
U.S. at 20-22.
224 Some maintain that the presumption against extraterritoriality is entirely distinct
from the presumption in favor of international law. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 815
(ScaliaJ., dissenting) (describing the two as "wholly independent"); EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 264 (1991) (Aramco) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (same). The Supreme
Court has elsewhere suggested that the presumption against extraterritoriality is based on
the desire to avoid "'international discord,'" Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5
(1993) (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248), as well as on other factors, including the "com-
monsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind." Id. at
204 n.5; see Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993) ("We have recently
held, however, that the presumption has a fotudation broader than the desire to avoid
conflict with the laws of other nations.").
225 See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248; see also Turley, supra note 21, at 221 (describing this
opinion as upholding a very strong presumption that "maximizes the role of the legislative
process in resolving controversial matters"); id. at 219 n.172 (noting that although some
rules defer to the Executive Branch, the "presumption against extraterritoriality defers to
the legislative branch").
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the affirmative intention of. the Congress clearly expressed" because
Congress "alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an im-
portant policy decision where the possibilities of international discord
are so evident and retaliative action so certain. 226
A somewhat analogous question arises in the relationship be-
tween the Charming Betsy canon and the deference afforded to agency
interpretations of statutes under Chevron USA v. National Resources De-
fense Council.227 When the agency interpretation of a statute is entitled
to deference, and when that interpretation would violate interna-
tional law, courts must resolve the conflict between the two interpre-
tive tools. Were the preferences of the Executive Branch enough to
defeat the canon, however, there would be no conflict-the agency
interpretation would control under either Chevron or Charming Betsy.
Lower courts, however, generally have not concluded that Chevron
automatically trumps the Charming Betsy canon. Instead they have of-
ten used the two interpretive canons in tandem;228 in cases of conflict,
courts have taken varying approaches. 229 The Supreme Court has not
226 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957); see also McCuloch, 372
U.S. at 22 (reasoning that Congress "'alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such
an important policy decision'" and concluding that arguments urging another interpreta-
tion should be directed to Congress (quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at 147)).
227 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
228 See, e.g., Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (using the
Charming Betsy canon to conclude that the agency's interpretation of the statute was rea-
sonable under Chevron); Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581-82 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (reversing the Court of International Trade and deferring to the Department
of Commerce's interpretation of the statute in part because it was consistent with the
international obligations of the United States); see also Lawrence R. Walders & Neil C.
Pratt, Trade Remedy Litigation-Choice o0 Forum and Choice of Law, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENr. 51, 68-73 (2003) (describing the courts' efforts to reconcile the two interpre-
tive approaches in the context of international trade); cf Luigi Bormioli Corp. v. United
States, 304 F.3d 1362, 1365-66, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the language of the
statute was clear, and there was no reason to consider Chevron deference, in part because
the government's reading of the statute was consistent with international law). In another
case in which Chevron deference and Charming Betsy pointed toward the same result, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to defer to the Department of Agricul-
tnre and rejected the Department's reliance on the canon. Miss. Poultry Ass'n, Inc. v.
Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to use the canon based on the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAT") and rejecting the Department's read-
ing of the statute).
229 See Allegheny, 367 F.3d at 1343, 1348 (holding, based in part on the Charming Betsy
canon and a decision of the I17O, that the language of the statute spoke directly to the
issue in question and that the agency's interpretation was clue no deference under Chev-
ron); Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (deferring to
the Commerce Department's interpretation of the statute, and refusing to apply the
Charming Betsy canon in part because the NVTO ruling in question was distinguishable);
Hyundai Elec. Co. v. United States, 53 E Supp. 2d 1334, 1343-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999)
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considered a direct conflict between the two and has sent somewhat
mixed signals about the relationship between the canons. 230
The foregoing discussion shows at the very least that the views of
the Executive Branch do not automatically defeat the canon. This is
true apparently even in the context of Chevron deference, where the
reasons to defer are strong, in part because the preferences of the Ex-
ecutive Branch are expressed through the formal mechanisms of a
federal agency.23 1 Thus although interpretation of the AUMF does not
involve Chevron deference, 232 the courts' reluctance to discard the
Charming Betsy canon (and the presumption against extraterritoriality)
(reasoning that "unless the conflict between an international obligation and Commerce's
interpretation of a statute is abundantly clear, a court should take special care before it
upsets Commerce's regulatory authority under the Charming Betsy doctrine"); Caterpillar
Inc. v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1241, 1244, 1247 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (applying the
Charming Betsy canon to construe the 1930 Tariff Act contrary to the interpretation given
by the U.S. Customs Service); see also Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals,
and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. j. INr'L L. 675, 739-40 (2003) (generalizing based on
the Caterpillar Inc. v. United States decision to conclude that "where the administration in-
terpretation is inconsistent with the international obligation, courts have applied Chevron
and Charming Betsy and reversed the decision."); Walders & Pratt, supra note 228, at 70-73
(describing different approaches taken in the trade cases). A recent trade case involving
the Tariff Act of 1930 emphasized the deference due the Department of Commerce and
accorded "no deference" to a WTO case. Corus Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d
1343, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
230 See Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The Flagging Spirit of
the Law, 28J. LEGIS. 113, 134-37 (2002) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 421
(1999) and arguing that in immigration cases the Supreme Court has ignored the Charm-
ing Betsy canon in favor of Chevron deference); cf Bradley, The Charming Bets), Canon, supra
note 21, at 523-24 (arguing that the Supreme Court has not been receptive to efforts to
expand the canon beyond its current scope). In contrast, justice Scalia considered a
conflict between Chevron and the presumption against extraterritoriality and concluded
that the presumption trumped. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). The majority agreed that the presumption trumped defer-
ence to the agency, but it applied Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), not Chenon,
deference. Id. at 257-58. In another case, the Cotrt cited Charming Betsy for the proposi-
tion that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional questions, and in this con-
text concluded that Charming Betsy trumped Chevron. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
231 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-34 (2001) (discussing Chevron
deference and denying deference to the U.S. Customs Service's classification letters). As
the Supreme Court recently noted, "the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chev-
ron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adju-
dication." Id. at 230.
232 Nothing in the Hamdi opinions suggested that Chevron deference was (fie the
President's interpretation of the AUMF, and only justice Thomas suggested that the courts
should give substantial deference to the President's interpretation of the AUMF. See Hamdi,
124 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The distinct issue of deference to the Ex-
ecutive Branch as to the content of international law is considered below. See infra notes
270-275.
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when faced with Chevron, suggests that the canon should apply in con-
struing the AUMF, even if it runs contrary to the views of the Presi-
dent. It also suggests that the canon has functioned not only to dis-
able the courts in favor of either of the political branches, but that it
also reflects some preference for legislative rather than executive de-
cision making.
Other considerations also provide reasons, beyond the descrip-
tive analysis above, to prefer legislative rather than executive decisions
to violate international law in the context of interpreting the AUMF.
For example, the Executive Branch is often correctly said to have par-
ticular expertise with respect to international law and to represent the
nation in foreign affairs. 233 This might suggest that the Charming Betsy
canon should not apply in this context, because the courts should de-
fer to any decision of the President that might violate international
law rather than seeking more explicit authorization from Congress. 23 4
The text of the Constitution, however, undermines this argument by
vesting Congress-rather than the President-with much of the
authority to make decisions regarding international law, particularly
in the context of war. These specific, textual grants of authority un-
dermine broader, non-textual arguments about the President's supe-
riority in all areas of foreign affairs and national defense.
233 I-amdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2675 (Thonas, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "[t]he Founders
intended that the President have primary responsibility-along with the necessary power-
to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation's foreign relations" and citing the
President's virtues of speed, decisiveness, and secrecy); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1964) ("[T]he Execttive Branch speaks not only as an inter-
preter of generally accepted and traditional rules .... but also as an advocate of standards it
believes desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns.");
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("[T]he President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties
with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates."); see also Louis HENKIN,
FOREIGN AtFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 32 (2d ed. 1996); Curtis A. Brad-
ley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Afjairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 687-88, 702 (2000); John Yoo,
Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation,
89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 873-77 (2001) (reviewing FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN
THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000)).
234 Cf Sale, 509 U.S. at 188 ("Acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial
application Unless such an intent is clearly manifested. That presumption has special force
when we are constrtuing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and mili-
tary affairs for which the President has unique responsibility."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 112, cnt. c (1987); Bradley, supra
note 233, at 687-88, 702, 708-09 (arguing that the expertise of the Executive Branch is
one basis on which to defer to its interpretation of customary international law, as well as
some statutes and treaties).
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The Constitution, in Article I, section 8, grants to Congress the
power to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."2 35 All three
were both defined terms at international law and integrally related to
the conduct of war.236 For example, letters of marque and reprisal
were permitted under certain circumstances by the law of nations;
they empowered the seizure of foreign subjects or property, and their
use was considered a limited form of hostilities short of war.2 37 Under
British precedent, it was the executive who issued such letters, but the
U.S. Constitution lodges this authority with Congress. 238 The power of
Congress to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations" 23 9 provides
another example (although one less directly connected to war), 240
235 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 11.
236 See 3JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 572, at 411-12 (reprint 1987) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) ('The power to de-
clare war would of itself carry the incidental power to grant letters of narque and reprisal,
and make rules concerning captures."); FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW
§§ 216-218, 455 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1884) (describing international law govern-
ing the right of capture and noting that the Constitution vests Congress with the power to
authorize them); Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
321, 336-57 (2003) (describing the meaning of "declare war" in eighteenth-century inter-
national law); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1543,
1613-15 (2002) [hereinafter Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers] (describing the meaning
of "letters of Marque and Reprisal" in eighteenth-century international law);John Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 167, 198-208 (1996) (describing the effect of declaring war under international law
and noting that "attacking without a declaration might violate international law").
237 David Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers: Protecting Public and Private
Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1173 (1992); Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 61, 66-70 (1995); Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, supra note 236,
at 1613-18. Indeed, William Blackstone noted that the "'prerogative of granting [letters of
marque and reprisal] ... is nearly related to ... making war; this being indeed only an
incomplete state of hostilities."' Lobel, supra, at 68 (qtloting I WILLIAM BILACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 258 (photo. reprint, Garland Publ'g 1978)
(1765)). When a letter was issued, captors depended on prize courts applying interna-
tional law to confer title to the seized property. See DavidJ. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of
Prize, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 31, 41-52 (1995) (reviewing 11 J.H.W. VERZI.IL ET AL., INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992)). The
Continental Congress passed resolutions to prevent American privateers from violating
international law. See Kevin Marshall, Putting Privateers in Their Pkce: The Applicability of the
Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 975-76 (1997).
238 See Lewittes, supra note 237, at 1173. One commentator has also emphasized that
Congress, not "the discretion of a commanding officer," controls the right to capture and
confiscate property during war. WHARTON, supra note 236, § 217.
239 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 10.
240 Many examples of the exercise of this power, however, are connected to war. A
nineteenth-century commentator, for example, provided the following two "[i]llustrations
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because failure to punish individuals guilty of such crimes could also
put the United States in violation of the law of nations. 241 The Com-
mander-in-Chief power may have lodged some power to violate inter-
national law in the hands of the President, but under eighteenth-
century international law there were far fewer norms governing the
actual conduct of battle than there are today.242
Applying the canon to construe the scope of congressional
authorization for the President's actions does no violence to separa-
tion-of-powers principles for another reason. If constitutional text
puts the power in question squarely in the President's hands (under
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, for example), then this tool of con-
struction is unnecessary, because the scope of authorization by Con-
gress is not relevant. If Congress directly speaks to the issue, the
canon does not apply. It is only in play to the extent that the Presi-
dent's authority is at least partly a function of congressional authoriza-
tion and to the extent that the scope of such authorization is unclear.
Aside from the modest preference for legislative action described
above, the Charming Betsy canon can also serve a separation of powers
function if it accurately reflects congressional intent by keeping dele-
gations of congressional power to those that Congress actually in-
tended (or would have intended) to authorize. It also serves separa-
tion-of-powers values if it does a good job of eliciting preferences
from Congress 243 and if it provides a bright-line rule against which
of the exercise of this power": the "'neutrality laws,'" which forbid the "fitting out and
equipping of armed vessels, or the enlisting of troops, for either of two belligerent powers
with which the United States is at peace"; and "the laws which prohibit the organizing
within the country of armed expeditions against friendly nations." HENRY CAMPBELL
BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197 (St. Patti, West Publ'g Co.
1895).
241 See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish
• . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447, 465-67 (2000). A ma-
jor debate in the 1780s was whether this power properly belonged to the federal or state
governments. See id.
242 See GREEN, supra note 99, at 28-53 (tracing the history and sources of law of armed
conflict).
2413 See Elhatlge, supra note 54, at 2238-46. Elhauge emphasizes that some canons can
be justified as effectively eliciting preferences from Congress, but to do so they should
favor the parties with the weakest access to the congressional agenda. In Hamdi's case,
such a justification would suggest that the party urging compliance with international law
should be favored over the President, who has particularly good access to Congress. See
infra note 244.
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Congress can make future authorizations and against which the Presi-
dent can take action. 244
In summary, under one separation-of-powers perspective, appli-
cation of the Charming Betsy canon to interpret general authorizations
for the use of force is unnecessary because one of the political
branches-the President-has already decided in favor of the action
in question. But neither does application of the canon keep the deci-
sion for the courts, another potential separation-of-powers value. In-
stead, it disables the courts,245 but favors a legislative over an executive
decision to violate the norm in question. There are some reasons to
think that the history of the Charming Betsy and other canons supports
a modest preference for the legislature, and the text of the Constitu-
tion also provides some grounds on which to favor legislative deci-
sions regarding the violation of international law during war. The
canon also operates in a context that minimizes separation-of-powers
problems because it leaves the ultimate decision about violating in-
ternational law with the political branches, it does not apply if the
244 Cf Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (siating that "[w]hat is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear
interpretive rules"). Error costs are a potential reason not to employ the canon. Applying
the canon will push courts toward construing congressional authorization narrowly, and
the courts may err on the side of denying to the President power that Congress intended
to confer. Particularly during war, these error costs might be too high tojuslify the canon.
Several considerations suggest that this is not true, however. First, the Executive Branch
appears to have the best chance of securing legislation from Congress to correct any errors
by the courts. See Elhauge, supra note 54, at 2238 (citing William N. Eskridge,Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L:J. 331, 348 tbl.7 (1991)). The
flurry of legislation that followed the September 11, 2001, attacks provides strong evidence
of the President's power to control the legislative agenda in times of war. See Bryant & To-
bias, supra note 16, at 386-91 (2002) (describing part of the legislative agenda in Septem-
ber and October of 2001, including the Senate's suspension of its normal operating pro-
cedures in the days after September 11, 2001, in order to expedite the President's
requests); Events of Sept. 11 Spur Revised Custody Procedures, Altered Legislative Landscape, 78
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1493, 1493-95 (Sept. 24, 2001) (describing changes to the legisla-
tive agenda immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001); Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Trilntnals, 111 YaLE L.J.
1259, 1276-77 (2002) (noting that after September 11, 2001, Congress functioned "with
much more than all deliberate speed. In record time, it considered and enacted a broad
array of laws, many of them in almost precisely the form sought by the President"). Mr.
Hamdi, however, is less likely to secure corrective action by Congress. Second, decisions
that must be made quickly, and that respond immediately to an armed threat or armed
attack, may fall within the President's plenary authority as Commander in Chief.
245 The courts do have to make a determination as to whether the President's action
violates (or potentially violates) international law. See infra notes 246-256 and accompany-
ing text. The point here is that to the extent that the cation is animated by the concern
that courts might interpret a statute to violate international law without the explicit
authorization of Congress, it is appropriate to apply it in this context.
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President's actions fall within his plenary authority under the Consti-
tution, and it works to maximize the preferences of Congress.
C. Hamdi Revisited
This Section returns to the plurality's opinion in Hamdi, and con-
siders how the Charming Betsy canon would have functioned based on
the claim that the detention violated the Third Geneva Convention and
the ICCPR. These examples illustrate that by applying the canon the
plurality would have made a better use of international law-one that is
more carefully linked to the intentions of Congress, serves separation-
of-powers functions, and promotes some normative goals. In consider-
ing these examples, this Section also addresses two additional questions
about the canon. The discussion of the Third Geneva Convention con-
siders the extent to which courts should decide difficult questions of
international law in applying the canon, and the discussion of the
ICCPR considers the application of a non-self-executing human rights
treaty as the basis for the canon.
1. The Third Geneva Convention
Consider first the plurality's conclusion that the AUMF did not
authorize Hamdi's detention beyond "the cessation of active hostili-
ties," based in part on Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention. 246
The plurality reached this conclusion relying on the "law of war," but it
did so (asJustice Thomas suggested) without actually deciding whether
Hamdi was entitled to the protection by this term of the Third Geneva
Convention, 247 and without citing any customary international law that
would otherwise protect him. This problematic reference to interna-
tional law is poorly linked to the text of the AUMF or the presumed
intent of the drafters; in one sense it also shows a disregard for the
binding norms of international law. Applying the Charming Betsy canon,
by contrast, would serve both functions. The Geneva Conventions pro-
vide a particularly robust basis for the canon; they are long-standing
246 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 96, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406. The plurality
also cited to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and the 1929 Geneva Convention, all
three of which have been largely superseded by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); supra note 96. This Section
puts aside the question of whether the Third Geneva Convention applies to detainees who
are nationals of the detaining power. See supra note 112.
247 See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
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treaties 248 incorporated into current U.S. military practice, to which the
executive has repeatedly said it will adhere.
249
This application of the canon raises an additional separation-of-
powers consideration, however. The protection against indefinite de-
tention in the Third Geneva Convention only applies if Hamdi
qualifies as a prisoner of war, or is entitled to an Article 5 hearing
(and is thus entitled to prisoner-of-war protections unless and until
the hearing determines otherwise). 250 In this situation, the Court
must make some determination about the content of international
law to apply the canon; to this extent, it is not just deferring to Con-
gress for more specific direction on questions of international law.
251
There are three potential approaches to this problem-not em-
ploy the canon (and avoid the question), apply the canon to avoid a
possible violation of international law, or decide the issue of entitle-
ment to prisoner-of-war status. Deciding among these approaches de-
pends upon the interpretive value of the presumption on the one
hand, and the difficulty in (or costs associated with) determining
whether the executive's actions violate international law on the other.
In this case, the interpretive value of the presumption is high, making
the first approach unattractive (unless other interpretive tools clearly
248 The Geneva Conventions may or may not be self-executing. See Omar Akbai, Note,
Losing Geneva in Guantanamo Bay, 89 IowA L. RFv. 195, 219-23 (analyzing Article 5 of
Third Geneva Convention and suggesting that it is self-executing). Compare Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, C.J., concurring), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (indicating that the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 are not self-executing), and Hamdi x: Rumsfeld, 316 F3d 450, 468-69
(4th Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. (2004) (same), with United States v. Lindh,
212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002) (indicating that some parts of the Third Geneva
Convention are self-executing).
249 See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text. Jus in bello norms that the United
States has acknowledged are part of customary international law also serve as a strong basis
for application of the canon. See, e.g., supra notes 194, 200.
250 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 96, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406 ("Prisoners of
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostili-
ties."). Article 4 sets out the criteria for prisoner-of-war status, id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-
22, and Article 5 provides that should "any doubt arise" as to whether a prisoner meets the
requirements of Article 4, "such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Conven-
tion until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." Id. art.
5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24. It bears repeating that lamdi did not argue that lie was entitled to
prisoner-of-war status, supra note 95, and his briefs make only passing reference to the
international materials cited by Justices O'Connor and Souter. See Brief for Petitioners at
*16-17, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 378715. This
confirms that the relationship between international law and the scope of the AUMF is
uncertain, and that using the Charming Betsy canon in this context would provide some
much-needed clarity.
251 See Bradley, supra note 21, at 531-32; Turley, supra note 21, at 238.
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resolve the question). The second approach makes use of the canon,
but avoids any decision about the content of international law, except
that a violation is possible, which avoids what (in some cases) might
be a difficult decision about international norms. It does so, however,
at the risk of denying the President some power that he might enjoy if
the court fully analyzed the international norm in question. Here,
however, the issue the court must decide is simply the entitlement to
an Article 5 hearing-which still leaves the ultimate decision as to en-
titlement to prisoner-of-war status up to those conducting the hearing
(generally military personnel), 2 2 not the court. In this case, the third
approach is probably best.
Nevertheless, the best default rule is probably to construe gen-
eral authorizations for the use of force to avoid a potential conflict
with the Third Geneva Convention. This approach is most consistent
with the historical use of the canon, which has not traditionally in-
volved answering difficult questions of international law.253 The risk of
under-enforcement is mitigated by the factors considered above, 254 as
well as the (admittedly limited) deference afforded to the executive as
to the content of international law.2 55 The risk is also limited by the
Supreme Court's obligation to scrutinize international law carefully
enough to conclude that there is real risk of a violation and by the
relatively well-defined set of norms embraced by international hu-
manitarian law.256
252 See Thomas J. Lepri, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural Protections
for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants Under Ex Parte Quirin, 71 FORDHAM L. REv.
2565, 2573-75 (2003) (describing Article 5 military hearings during the Vietnam War).
253 See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382-83 (1959) (ap-
plying the canon based in part on the "relevant interests of foreign nations" and the "le-
gitimate concern of the international community"); Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at
118 (interpreting statute to avoid conflict with international law, but not clearly identifl'ing
the legal obligation in question); Spector, 356 F.3d at 646-47 (applying canon to avoid "stark
likelihood" of violating international law); see aho Swaine, supra note 58, at 715-17 (defend-
ing what he calls "compound avoidance-avoiding"); cf Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255 (employing
the presumption against extraterritoriality to avoid "difficult issues of international law").
254 See supra note 233-244 and accompanying text. For example, the canon only ap-
plies when the scope of authorization is unclear, Congress can override the courts' inter-
pretation, and the President has good access to the legislative agenda, especially during
times of national security crises. Supra note 244. Also, the canon is used in this context to
avoid potential conflicts with international law, not to make binding interpretive decisions
that violate international law. Cf. Bradley, supra note 21, at 531-32 (observing that the
canon invokes international law primarily to avoid conflicts, not to give "independent,
affirmative effect" to international law).
255 See infra note 270-275 and accompanying text (discussing deference to the Execu-
tive Branch regarding the content of international law).
25 6See supra notes 147, 177.
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2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The detention of Hamdi may also violate the ICCPR, which pro-
hibits arbitrary detention. 257 For the following two reasons, however,
the alleged violations of the ICCPR form a weaker basis upon which to
rest the presumption: an understanding to the ICCPR added during
the ratification process states that it is not self-executing, 258 and the fact
that the ICCPR is a human rights treaty, not part of international hu-
manitarian law.
Because the ICCPR is not self-executing, courts cannot directly
enforce it absent implementing legislation. 259 The ICCPR could none-
theless serve as an interpretive norm (because it is not being used as a
directly enforceable right), but if the non-self-executing declaration
also reflects a preference against the domestic courts interpreting the
ICCPR in any context at all,260 this would suggest at least that it does
not make a good basis for the Charming Betsy canon.
There are several reasons, however, to reject this view. First, it
would have the effect of elevating customary international law and
257 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 9, S. EXEC.
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR], http://www.unhchr.ch/html/inenu3/b/accpr.htn (last visited Mar. 15, 2005);
see Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights in Support of Petitioners at *9-14, I-lamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WI 354184 (arguing that Hatdi's
detention violated the ICCPR); Brief of Amicus Curiae International Law Professors Listed
Herein in Support of Petitioners at *12-18, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004)
(No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 354186 (same).
258 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAl. COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
645, 657 (1992). The Bush Administration never clearly explained the meaning of the
non-self-executing understanding (which it proposed). Instead, it suggested both that it
meant that the ICCPR created no private right of action, and elsewhere that it meant that
the ICCPR did not create "private rights enforceable in U.S. courts." See David Sloss, The
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self Executing Declarations and Human Rights
Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 165-69 (1999). The first meaning would pose no bar to
the use of the ICCPR as an interpretive norm (because the ICCPR is not used to supply the
cause of action). The second explanation better tracks the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, but some courts appear to use the first formulation. See,
e.g., Hamdi, 316 E.3d at 468 ("Courts will only find a treaty to be self-executing if the
document, as a whole, evidences an intent to provide a private right of action." (quoting
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992)).
259 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3) (1987).
260 Cf Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763 ("Several times, indeed, the Senate has expressly de-
clined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying international human
rights law, as when its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing.");
supra note 172.
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sole executive agreements over non-self-executing treaties as an inter-
pretive norm,261 despite the formal participation of the President and
Senate in negotiating and ratifying all treaties. Second, the courts
have not suggested that the canon turns on this distinction. Third, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted treaties without deciding
whether or not they are self-executing. 262 Finally, because courts have
failed to clarify fully how to distinguish between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties, 263 this distinction would undermine the
clarity of the canon and provide less guidance for Congress about how
its authorizations for the use of force will be interpreted.
The ICCPR also lies outside the law of war, providing the other
potential objection for using it in this context. In contrast to the Ge-
neva Conventions, for example, the ICCPR is not incorporated into
U.S. military practice, the Executive Branch has not publicly commit-
ted itself to adhering specifically to the ICCPR during armed conflict,
and in general international human rights norms may be less well-
defined than international humanitarian law.264 Nonetheless, the
ICCPR is a treaty and thus received the approval of a supermajority of
the Senate, and the ICCPR itself has a derogation procedure for times
of "public emergency" that threaten national security,265 meaning that
the text of the ICCPR explicitly contemplates application of the treaty
in such situations. Indeed, the ICCPR permits derogation from the
provision that Hamdi's detention is said to violate-the prohibition
against arbitrary detention. 266 That the treaty makers explicitly de-
termined how it would apply in times of national security crises (and a
261 See Hoffman-La Roche, 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (interpreting a statute to "avoid unreason-
able interference with the sovereign authority of other nations" because "[t]his rule of
construction reflects principles of customary international law-law that (we must assume)
Congress ordinarily seeks to follow" (citing the Charming Betsy canon)); Rossi, 456 U.S. at
32 (applying the canon based on an executive agreement, not a treaty).
262 See Carlos M. Vazquez, The Fozr Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. INT'L L.
695, 716 (1995) ("In countless cases, the vast majority of those raising treaty-based claims,
the Court has resolved the case without even mentioning the self-execution issue.").
263 Id. at 716 n.99 (discussing the doctrine's "problematic status" and the Court's fail-
tire to "address ... the doctrine in many years despite the glaring need for clarification").
264 SeeJinks, supra note 97, at 374-75 n.30.
265 ICCPR, supra note 257, art. 4(l), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174 ("In time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed,
the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obliga-
tions under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation .... ").
26, Id. art. 4(2) ("No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16
and 18 may be made under this provision."). The prohibition against arbitrary detention is
found in Article 9. Id. art. 9(1), 999 U.N.TS. at 175.
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supermajority of the Senate agreed) suggests that all other things be-
ing equal, the AUMF should be construed to avoid violations of the
ICCPR, even during national emergencies.
Some cases may present difficult interpretive questions-for ex-
ample, the precondition for derogation (a "public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed") 267 does not lend itself well to judicial determination. In
other words, the interpretive value of the ICCPR is lower to begin with,
and here the costs of deciding whether there is a potential violation of
international law are high. In the Hamdi case itself, however, there is no
need to determine whether the preconditions for derogation are met,
because the President has not taken the necessary steps to derogate
from the terms of the treaty.268 Moreover, the substantive term prohibit-
ing arbitrary detention is one that the U.S. courts and international
tribunals have considered in a number of cases. 269 On balance, in this
situation, the courts should construe the AUMF to avoid a potential
conflict with the ICCPR's ban on arbitrary detention.
All in all, this discussion suggests that in the context of interna-
tional human rights law the canon may be easier to overcome, and
that the following factors are relevant in determining whether it
267 Id. art. 4(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
268 The Covenant requires the following:
Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of deroga-
tion shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Cove-
nant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by
which it was actuated.
ICCPR, supra note 257, art. 4(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. Although the United States has not
taken this step, the United Kingdom has. Citing the September II attacks and the U.N.
Security Council Resolutions condemning them as threats to international peace and se-
curity, the United Kingdom submitted an extensive letter to the Secretary General detail-
ing the security threat to the United Kingdom and describing the precise government
actions that might derogate from Article 9 of the ICCPR, and their temporal limitations.
See Derogation Notification, Dec. 18, 2001, http://www.unhchr.ch/htmil/meni3/)/
treaty5_asp.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
269 See, e.g., Kim Ho Ma, 257 F.3d at 1114 (applying the Charming Betsy canon to avoid a
conflict with the ICCPR's prohibition on arbitrary detention); Martinez v. City of Los An-
geles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that plaintiffs detention did not
violate ICCPR's ban on arbitrary detention); cf. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767-69 (holding that
the ICCPR did not create a private right of action because it is not self-executing and fur-
ther holding that customary international law based on the ICCPR did not create a right
of action for short-term detentions); Vuollane v Finland, U.N. Human Rts. Comm'n, 35th
Sess., Communication No. 265/1987, U.N. Doc. ICCPR/C/35/D/265/1987 (1989)
(finding Finland had violated ICCPR's ban on arbitrary detention).
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should apply: the participation of the political branches in the devel-
opment of the norm in question (and their continued commitment
to that norm), the extent to which it was intended to apply during
times of armed conflict, and the specificity of the norm in question. If
these considerations show that the action under consideration may
violate well-defined requirements of international law to which the
political branches have assented, and from which derogation is not
permitted, courts should hesitate to read a general authorization for
the use of force as embracing it.
Finally, this discussion raises an analytically distinct but important
question as to the proper deference to afford the Executive Branch in
determining the content of international law. This issue has been dis-
cussed in some detail elsewhere, 270 but several considerations bear
mention here. First, the inevitable functional arguments about the
President's unique ability to understand international problems asso-
ciated with foreign affairs and national defense271 must be considered
in conjunction with the text of the Constitution, which explicitly
lodges with Congress many powers directly related to both interna-
tional law and the conduct of war.272 Article III of the Constitution also
explicitly extends the judicial power of the United States to cases that
arise under treaties; 273 federal courts thus would seem to be fully em-
powered to interpret them. 274 Second, it bears repeating that if the
President is exercising his own authority as Commander in Chief (or
some other power granted by the Constitution), then the canon is not
in play at all. Third, affording the President very limited deference as
to the content of international law is supported by the reasoning of six
Justices in the Hamdi case, two of whom made clear and four of whom
suggested that the President is due no particular deference even re-
garding the content of international law, at least when it is used to con-
strue the scope of congressional authorization for the use of force. 275
270 See David .. Bedernian, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Inteipretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 1015-19 (1994); Bradley, supra note 233, at 701-15; Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judi-
cial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1298-1302 (2002); Yoo, supra note
233, at 871-73.
271 Yoo, supra note 233, at 864.
272 See supra notes 233-242 and accompanying text.
273 U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
274 Thomas 1-1. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal:
Reclaiming the Court's Original and Exriusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States
Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1846 (2004) (noting that "treaty interpretation" as
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CONCLUSION
Congressional authorization for the President's actions plays a
crucial role in the courts' construction of the President's war and for-
eign affairs powers. When Congress authorizes the use of force gener-
ally-either by resolution or by declaring war-international law can
serve as an important tool in determining the scope of that authoriza-
tion. Both human rights activists and government lawyers have em-
ployed international law in this way, the former arguing that authori-
zations are limited by international law and the government arguing
that the President's actions are authorized if they are consistent with
international law.
In Hamdi, the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify
the appropriate use of international law in this context, but it failed to
do so. It used international law to construe the scope of congressional
authorization, but without careful consideration of the source, con-
tent, or interpretive function of the legal norms upon which it relied.
As a result, it is difficult to understand exactly how those sources are
linked to the interpretation of Congress's authorization, and it is
difficult to predict how the Court will use international law in future
cases. This only contributes to the general confusion regarding the use
of international law to interpret the Constitution and acts of Congress.
There are, however, better ways of approaching international law,
and this Article has supplied one example. By presuming that general
authorizations for the use of force do not include actions that violate
international law, courts could better link their use of international
law to the intentions of Congress and serve separation of powers in
several different ways. Such an approach would likely also advance
many of the normative goals sometimes associated with domestic ap-
plication of international law, including the development of a robust
system of transnational norms and the enhancement of the role of the
United States in their development.
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